California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Theses Digitization Project

John M. Pfau Library

1992

The role of language in constructing consciousness in Margaret
Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale
Tamra Elizabeth DiBenedetto

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project
Part of the Literature in English, North America Commons

Recommended Citation
DiBenedetto, Tamra Elizabeth, "The role of language in constructing consciousness in Margaret Atwood's
The Handmaid's Tale" (1992). Theses Digitization Project. 1128.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/1128

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

The Role of Language in Constructing Consciousness
in Margaret Atwood's The Hand:maid's

Tale

A Thesis
Presented to the

Faculty of
California State University.
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for tpe Degree
Master of Arts
in

English Composition

By
Tamra Elizabeth DiBem<jdetto

September 1992

The Role of Language in Constructi.ng Consciousne
in Margaret Atwood's The Hancl:maid's

Tale

A Thesis
Presented to the

Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

By
Tamra Elizabeth DiBen€!detto

September 1992

Approved by:
2-6

Clark Mayo, Chair

Margaret|boane

Jennifer Raridisi

Date

2-

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many thanks to all who have helped

possible.

make this thfejsis

To Margaret Doane, thanks for giving so fdsely of

your time and of yourself.

Your generosity and kind \vords

encouraged me to continue writing when I felt like gi;v^ing
Thanks also to Jennifer Randisifor taking time ibut;. -'-

up.

from your sabbatical to read this and for your insigh'tful

suggestions.

To Clark Mayo, thank-you for lending so) much

time and energy to this project.

Thanks also for you;

ability to absorb the fall-out ftom freguent attacks
panic and "writer's frenzy," one of your traits which is,
undeniably, the most reliable measure of a true frien:a.

Thanks also for introducing me to the works of Margaj !2t

Atwood and Walker Percy, both of whom tave offered me| a
deeper appreciation for language and a richer perspecl:ive on
life.

These acknowledgments would not b e complete with 5Ut

thanking Manny, Angie and Amanda for u:ndergoing this

with me.

Thank^you for your patience, for an endless supply

of hugs and kisses, and for uhderstandjL
ing that mommy ?3ould
not bake cookies and write a thesis at the same time.,

Finally, many thanks to David Neighbou^s

and Catheriiii;

Walker for sharing their time and computer wizardry w ith me.
and to Janet Nickell for helping me to pull this all
together.

iii ' - •

To Daniel.

As always, my inspira tion.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTf;

.Ac3cnov7l6dyT[i©rits•••••••••••••••••••••••

•
'• •

06d3.Odtjloti•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •' • •' •

m

m

m .m

m- -m

m

m

• • • '• • •

Introduction..........................

Chapter 1

Deconstruction:

The Loss of

Chapter 2

Reconstruction and Renewal.

..............3O

Chapter 3

Ambiguity, Uncertainty, and

the

the self....8

Quest for Freedom.......... ............74

Chapter 4

Contextual Constructs and Constraints...91

Conclusion............................

...;.10B
..112

Works Cited.

V

INTRODUCTION

Through linguistic knowledge, the world as seen from
the diverse viewpoints of other social groups, t lat we
have thought of as alien, becoities intelligible ijn hew
terms. Alienness turns into a ne|w and often da rifying
way of looking at things.
Benjamin Whorf, "Language, Mind and Reality"

Ever since Benjamin Whoff first proposed what isi now

known as the theory of linguistic relativity, scholars have
debated how much influence, if any, la nguage has on a

person's perceptions of "reality."

Early in his studies of

different dialects and languages, Whorf became conviiiced
that individual conscibusness was closely related to, and

even determined by, one's language.

He linked this

assertioh to his understanding of the workings of thoi
processes, and strove throughout his

Writings

to demonstrate

the interconnection between thought and language.

This is

seen most clearly in his essay, "Language. Mind, and |
Reality": ■

Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by faf: the
greatest light shed upon it that we have is thrown by

the study of language.

This study

shows that the forms

of a person's thbughts are controlied by inexorcifole

laws of pattern of which he [or s tie] is unconscious.
These patterns are the unperceived

intricate

systematizations of his [or her] own language .
Thinking is itself in a language
■■ ■' ■

.. .

(252)

In this passage ^ Whorf aisserts not only the
interrelation of thought and language, but further, jt tie

,■

ii

dependency of thought on language, and the dependency of

>■ ■

.

^

'■ I

both thought and language on "intricate pattern systems"
within the human mind.

In most of his

writings, Whorlf

asserts that language acts as the catalyst for both the

genesis and conseguent Construction of these patterns; within
the human mind.

In essence, Whorf cla ims that different

languages actually form different patterns in speaker's*
minds^ which, in turn, influence and even "control" the ways

in which reality is perceived by indiv iduals
culture.

within eu

This notion that an individual's perception of

"reality," or in other words, a person 's "consciousness," is
controlled by the language he or she uses, is referred to as

"linguistic determinism."

Whorf's strongest assertion

regarding linguistic determinism is Shown in the follbwing

passage from "Language, Mind, and Reality":
Every language is a vast pattern-system, differeWt from

others, in which hre cuiturallyordained forms a;nd
categories by which the personality not only
communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or

neglects types of relationship an d phenomena, chknnels
his [or her] reasoning, and build 5
her] consciousness.

the house of

lis [or

(252)

What is especially interesting in this assertion
Whorf's claim that language^ as a vast pattern-system

IS

formulates the ways in which humans cc:mmunicate, and even

more essentially, the ways in which hu|:mans
around them.

analyze the world

By forming patterns and

relationships from among the multitudinous phenomena
encountered at any given moment> the human mind begins

construction of "knowledge."

This knowledge, or "wha

be known" is not limited to knowledge

of the externa1

the V
can

world,

but perhaps even more importantly, it is also the way in
which humans begin to "know" themselVes:

it is the

beginning of the construction of consciousness of botjh
"self" and Of "others."

the

Moreover, from Whorfs persp ective,

language is the shared symbolic system through which

lumans

not only communicate with those who sh.are their langiiage
(and possibly their "world view"), but

it is also the

mechanism for thinking the most personal and private ;

thoughts. Therefore, in Whorfian term|is,

language is

the

primary construct for both individual and collective
consciousnesses.

Recently, however, the strong version of Whorf's

of linguistic relativism has been challenged by many

contemporary linguists and language theorists (e.g., Slobin,
1974, Friedrich, 1986), because of its inherent determinism.
Many of these theorists have now refined Whorf's initial

theory of linguistic determinism to a
linguistic relativism.

"weaker" version of

Rather than profess that language

determines thought, these theorists maintain that

. . . certain aspects of language can predispose people
to think or act in one way rathei' than another, 1 but
there is no rigid determinisin:One is hot fully a

prisoner of one's language; it is; just a guide t
thought and other sorts of behavior.

(Slobin 122)

Although most linguists hold to t;his "weak" theory of

linguistic relativism rather than Whorf's "strong,"

deterministic version, I do take exception to Slobin

s use

of the word "just" in reference to language's role of
guiding "thought and other sorts of bsshavior."

If language

does indeed act as a guide to thought, then it may be quite

dangerous to underplay this relationship with a quali:fier
(e.g., "just") of any sort.

This is particularly true

when

analyzing the role that language plays in constructirig
social awareness and individual consci.ousness, as Mat garet

Atwood demonstrates throughout The Handmaid's Tale.

However, because language both influences and i^
influenced by both the "self" and others, which in tiiirn

influence one another, it is necessary to examine the

contexts within which language grows cind evolves.

By

examining the social, psychological, eind political contexts
of language, we can more clearly see what influence 1 anguage
has on both society and on individuals.

These contexts of

language are vital to meaning-making in the real world, and

as will be shown, are vital to meaning-making in the novel.
Twice in The Handmaid's Tale the narrator states, "Context

is all."

Playing on Hamlet's line, "Readiness is all," and

again on Lear's line, "Ripeness is all," Atwood focuses

the

reader's attention on the significance not only of th e- line
itself, but on the idea that we cannot understand (or

sense of") any situation without first comprehending
context within which it occurred.

"make
the

This phrase resonates

with meaning, and is essential in understanding the
construction of the novel (as Chapter 4 wi11 i1lustra;

but even more importantly, it is vital

'

to understanding the

construction of the narrator's self.

The narrator, known only by the p|atronymic Offred,

has

in a sense been de-contextualized with her immersion into

the dystopic and highly authoritarian regime of Gileai;d.

The

only way she can survive within this u nfamiliar and

dangerous culture is to strive to forget her past and
"reconstruct" or re-encultrate herself.

She soon learns,

however, that t^e religious, political

ical

contexts of this new society impose strict limitations

the ways in which she can construct hejrself.
of these contexts together, and is at

novel, is language.

What ties

all

the center of t.he

And it is language that brings iis

narrative, acts as the major force in

on

the

both the

deconstruction and the reconstruction of Offred's "sielf,"
and solidifies the social structure in Gilead, even though,

paradoxically, language is the most highly guarded commodity

in this futuristic society.

■ I

various conte;xts of

In this thesis, I will explore the

language, specifically the socio/pOlitical contexts o'f
language, which act as the constructs of both individ)aal
■

"selves" and of whole cominunities.

. . ...

..

;■ j

In most discussiofIS

of

constructiyism, the constant tensioh between the indi v^idual

and the group is set up as a polarity

one in which t;lie

and "others" are in constant struggle for supremacy o|e

ihdividua1 cpnsciousne:Ss.

self

the

However, as this thesis wi;LI

deiiionstrate, this tension between self and others is 'Lh

fact

the chief catalyst which enables Offred to ire-construct

her

(or

own consciousness while at the same tiine re-encultrat

re-socialize) herself within this foreign and hostilei
environment.

language.

In both endeavors, Offred's primary too;L is

Because language is the chief means by wh:L

humans communicate, and through communication make sense
■'

;

'■

. ,. ■ ■ ■

^

of

■]

their world and those around them, she relies on both] her

past, familiar language (connotative in nature and

i

figurative in meaning) and her present, limited langiiaige

(denotative in nature and literal in meaning) to
re-organize, talk about, and finally "know"

both the

new

regime in Gilead and most importantly, her new self i;n .

■'

relation to that community.

Chapter 1, "Deconstruction:

The

examine the ways in which language is

Loss of

used to both

deconstruct the old society and also to

society.

the Ser f" will

:

reconstruct a;

The focus will be primarily on the pplitics

new

of

language, and the ways in which those in power shape

people's perceptions through limiting

access to both

written

arid oral speech and also through the 1inguistic acts of

naming and labeling;
Chapter 2, "Reconstruction and Re newal," focvises

primarily on Offred's attempts to reco:nstruct
this new society.

herself within

It further explores the implicatio IS

of

linguistic relativity and the intercon sections betwee i
language, thought, and the constructio'n

of the self.

Also,

it will describe and analyze the proce 3S whereby Offr ad : .
comes to understand her new society, how
language as a mediator between the sel

,

'-v'

she uses inn it

imposed on he:-by

the new regime and the self that she onee was, and the ways

in which language acts to construct he

corisciousness anew;

Chapter 3, "Ambiguity, Uncertainty,

and the Quest for

Freedom," explores the possibilities a /^aliable with multiple

interpretations.

Furthermore, it explo:res the relationship

between writer and reader and and how the two might interact

in an effort to make meaning.
Chapter 4, "Contextual Construct's
. and ConstrailIts,"

explores the last section of The Handmaid's Tale, an

"epilogue" erititled "Histprical Notes
TALE," with specific empihasis on the

affects meaning in communication;

on THE HANDMAID'

ys in which context

Wcl

Thi^ chapter represents

an effort to demonstrate (in Atwood's words) that context.
indeed, is all.

CHAPTER 1

DECONSTRUCTION;

THE LOSS 0F THE SELF

What is commonly referred to as culture . . . is! no
more than the official ideology of those in power.
Robert St. Glair, "The Politics of Language"
Definition, the creation of categories—these are
useful and necessary, but they are also dangerdus. . .
If they become staightjackets, restricting and ;
confining, they are destructive; they have become false
naming. True naming is a process of infinite grpwth,
infinite flexibility.
Karen Lindssy. Friends as Familv

Imagine being torn from a familiar culture—alienated

from family, friends, and community-^and being forcec
an unfamiliar and hostile e^nvironment.

into
?e-,

where all the rules have changed—the •rules" of which most

of us are not even conscidusly aware;

rules governing

verbal and non-verbal communication, rililes regarding

both

ays of

dressing, ways of actihg, ways of knowing, ways of bei ng.
How would we act?

How would we "learn" the new rules

would we make sense of our new world?

How

How would we si. rvive?

Margaret Atwood's noyel. The Handmaid's Tale, not onlv

formulates these questions, but in doing so, strikes at the
very core of what developmental psychologists, language

theorists, and philosophers have strugcfled with for
centuries:

How is meaning made?

To e> plore this question,

Atwood sets her dystopian novel in the futuristic setting of
Gilead,: within which a fanatical and fundamentalist

8

Christian regime has violently and quickly overthrown'

U.S. government and seized control. A|twood immerses

the

ler

central character within the hostile, oppressive, and
,

■

■ ■

■

■!

unfamiliar environment of Gilead, and in doing so, explores

the ways in which an individual must re-learn the rulps
governing speech, thought and action in order to make

of a foreign environment.

sense

In this respect, the making of

meaning becomes the primary activity of the central
character and narrator. Offred, as she strives to survive in
and make sense of her new world.

This meaning-making activity is clearly defined by
developmental psychologist Robert Kegan in The Evolving
Self;

Seen psychologically, this procesi

is about the

development of "knowing"; but at the same time, w

experience this activity. . .1 use the word "meaning"

to refer to this simultaneously ejiistemblogical and
ontological activity; it is about knowing and being,

about theory-making and investment^s
the self.

and commitments of

(Kegan 45)

In this sense, the making of meaning involves ways of

"knowing," primarily the types of "know ledge" that are
sanctioned by an individual's community (or society or;
culture) which establishes the nature, criteria and validity
of "what can be known."

Cognitively, meaning-iiiaking

involves the growth and development of cognitive schemes.

through which individuals "pattern" information.

cognitive patterns (or Schemes) then serve

These

to form

connections and establish relations between "old

information" ah "new information."

Moreover, the making of

meaning also encompasses "ways of being"—whether or not an
individual accepts current paradigms formed by the coiTmiunity
or society to which he or she holds me:|mbership

Of whether,

instead, the individual fprmuiates new ways of making
meaning.

The ways in which an ihdividual mak^

world, or comes to understand a^^^

of the

"kho w" it, are highp-y

indioative of an individual's ways of being, in the

j

existential, rather than essential, se use of "being."|

Therefore, this meahing^making activitj/ involves not only
assimilating information, but making cioiceS about what the
information "means."

Furthermore, mea:ling-making is an

experience (or activity) through which we dome to knpV both
ourselves and our world.
construct.

It iS not a static, theoretica1

Rather, it is an active, o:

the heart of which are the symbols of

-going process| at
anguage.

This||

meaning^making activity is central to thought and
Jf
consciousness and, as Walker Percy con-■inuaily reminds
us,

it is a uniquely human actiyity (Sianobsts

123).

Throughout The Handmaid's Tale. O fred shows tha f:
creating meaning (or "making" sense) o

her new world 1

IS

active process which involves the reco jiceptualization'

of

"reality" and the consequent process o

■■

10

forgetting hei

an

in order to survive in the present^

It is Offred's

meaning-making activity which forms the

basis of the

narrative construction of the novel, a nd also vividly

illustrates the role that language pla|ys in constructing a
new society while simuitaneously deconstructing the old.

If

is a story about the deconstruction an d subsequent
reconstruction Of one woman's Conscioushess in the midst of

a hostile, confusing, and inherently "self"-alienatinig
socio-political environment.

The new government in Gilead is a ole to redefine
culture, construct a new society, and impose its world view

on the populace through placing strihgsnt
language.

controls on

Permeated by a fear of individuals thinking for

themselves and staging a revolt, those in power ban t:ie use
of interpersonal communication and deprive all but thb most
powerful access to reading and writing

These stringent

controls on language represent the government's attempt to

turn people into "objects"; through the

subjectivity, a11 become "others."
unfamiliar environment.

loss of

They are aliens in an

They must, theh, not only learn the

"rules" underlying both the culture and the language,!? they

must also re-encultrate (or resocializ^) themselves.

This

chapter will explore the ways in which those in poweriimpose
their oppressive ideology on the populace and attempt to
limit the proliferation of meaning, to mark bpuhdaries

between members of society through labhling, and to strip

11

language of emotion arid feeling by stressing literal Irather
than non-literal (or metaphorical) meaning.
The Gileadean government is patriarchal in the extreme
and because of its radical, right-wing religious ideo"
believes that it is constructing a sbciety "sanctione|d" by
Biblical precedent.

Most of its "rules" have what thkDse

power consider to be Scriptural preGedent.
of these "rules" is the conscription of

in

The most bbvious

a Handmaiden to a

Commander for the purpose of childbearing.

This practice

finds its roots—and what the Gileadea n government purports

to be its justification—^in Genesis 30: 1-3, the passage
which is the source for one of the riov si's epigraphs:; "And
when Rachel saw that she bare Jacob no

chiIdren, Rachfa1

envied her sister; and said unto Jacob, Give me children, or

else I die. . . . And she said, Behold my maid Bilhal..
.':

*

She

' ■ ■ ,! ■■

shall bear upon my knees, that I may a Lso have children by

her."

However, consigning and erislavi:ig women as handmaids,

for purposes of bearing children for the upper echelon^ is

not the only practice—or laiw—which gains its purported
authority from Scriptural precedence.

Others include the

silencing of women (found in Paul's le:ter

to the

Corinthians), the sovereignty and suprkmacy of males i

(Genesis, particularly, but also throughout

Paul's lei: ters),

and many other Laws derived from both Old and New Tesl: ament
texts.

12

One of the first things the goverinment

does to

implement its radical ideology is to d;ivide, classify,
label women according to social rank aind status.

labeling system that the government im|iplemehts
boundaries between men and wpmen, and
various "classes" of women.

Ttie

demarjcates

further, betwe|e'i

There are

"classes" of women in Gilead:

ancj

flye distinct

the Wivees

who are marpr Led

to

high ranking and powerful Commanders atnd other top mi:
officers; the Aunts who have some accesss

to the writ|ten

Word; the Marthas who are the servants of the Wives and are

in charge of domestic responsibilities;
j the Econowivjes who
are married to the working classes and are incapable: of

reproduction due to genetic mutations stemming from Exposure
to nuclear and other ehvironmental wastes; and the

Handmaids, who have proven their reproductive capabil;i.
.ties
in the past, and whose bodies have been consigned toithe
service of reproducing children for the members of the
' - . ■ ' '
'■ ' .
■
j"., '
high-ranking, white officials of the new regime. A ieist

category (actually a "sub-category") of women are laJDi-iled
"Unwomen."

This category consists of Handmaids who

failed to reproduce after three one-year assignmentsiwith

three different Commanders, some lesbieins (referred tci

in

the novel as "gender traitors"), and nuns who will not
recant their vows and their allegiance to the Roman Ga tholic

Church.

These women are sent to "The (j^olonies," a

e of

labor camp where they clean up nuclear waste, with thei

13

consequehces of prolonged and unprotected exposure to
radiation, leading to severe illness, disease, and
ultimately death.
Although the classification syste m used in the novel

may seem extreme because of its blatan t tendency to devalue

people, it is not as foreign as it applears.

Nearly all

societies have some system which categbrizes, classifies,
and separates people into classes or castes.

Some examples

of social labels are the "Untouchables '• of India (similar in

social status and duty to the Unwomen bf Gilead), or even
closer to home, the "savages" and "heai:hens" of 17th and

18th century America.

Although the practice of labelj ng

IS

generally derogatory and prejudicial, it is also probably
the most common method whereby humans denote the

similarities or differences between people within soci.ety.
Labeling is equivalent to the Piagetian concept of
classification, a cognitive process whcsreby a person,

when

shown a group of different items, focusies on a single

characteristic or trait and then group^

the items accci]
rding

to that single characteristic or trait (Woolfolk 61).
Although classification is a natur al, and importarnt.

developmental stage in cognition, when used to "groups

people" through labeling—especially according to a singular
trait or characteristic-^^it can easily

oppression and devaluation.

become a means cot

By their very nature, labeels

prevent alternatives in the process of classification.

14

in

"Linguistic Factors in Prejudice," Gordon Allport states
that "every label applied to a given person refers pr operly
only to one aspect pf his [or her] nature" (108).
particularly true When the label is meant

person-as-entity; in other words, when

T3iis'^-is;

to stand for the

the label acts as the

primary indication of a person'sstatus, occupation, and

identity in his or her society.

Allport

refers to tliese

labels as "labels of primary potency" because they call
attention to what society has deemed tle primary trait of an

individual, while overlooking all other

traits.

Gordon

states that labels of primary potency ••act as shriekiig

sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations thcr; we

might otherwise perceive" (108).

Ofte::n, labels of primary

potency limit the possible ways that a person can be

perceived by society, and maty possibly limit self-peroeptiori
as well.

Labels of primary potency ari one of the ways in

which self-concept is established.

Therefore, the labeling

system used in Gilead serves a dua1 pu;rpose:

It divides,

categorizes, and classifies people acc<[)rdirig to socia
and duty while it simultaneously places

ways in which people are perceived by

rank

limitations on the

other members of

society and also by themselves.
In a society like Gilead, where

the

covert yet implicit

goal is to dehumanize people, devaluat;.on through labeling
is an effective

means to this end.

Through

bringing our

attention to this blatant (although often overlooked) form
15

e a closer looki at
of oppression, Atwood allows us to takle

Gorisciously—dQ with
what we commonly—although possibly uncohsciously'—do!

language, specifically the act of labeling, in our bw:n
society.

What Atwood also brings to the

reader's att

sntion,

however, are the ways that society's perceptions of
"reality" are transformed through the

use of labels,

long to the cla
Linguistically speaking, all labels belong
class of

nouns, the element of language which "hameS" things.
Through the use of nouns (names) we classify our

surroundings.

However, as Allport poipts out, the hukan

capacity and act of naming brings with it a parallel ? hange

in the way reality is perceived:
To state the matter technically, k noun abstract

from

a concrete reality some one feature and assemble
different concrete realities only with respect
one feature . . . Thus each label

) this

we use, especially

those of primary potency> distracts our attention from
concrete reality.

The living, breathing complex

individual—the ultimate unit of human nature—is lost

to sight.

(108)

In this passage, Allport identifies an essential parad ox

involved in the act of "naming":

although classifying

the

world through use of nouns (through "neiming" things) is

..

essential for humans to begin to make sense of the wor Id,:- ■

nouns also haye the capacity for simpli.fying complex aspects
of the world and individuals within the world.

16

We name what

we know, but does the name allow us to look beyond the

single feature amplified by the name (noun) itself?

it, instead, simplify our conceptualization

Or does

of that which is

named, allowing us only to perceive a single aspect pf the
"concrete reality" rather than the alternate, complek

"realities" beyond the name?

Although naming is necessary

for cognitive organization and patterning (which in turn

produce cognitive development), naming may also limit the
possible alternative ways in which "th at

which is namfed" can

be perceived or "known."

■Through the use of labels. Specif{L
ically in the act of
re-naming and labeling women, the powe

structure in Gilead

criminatory, bul, which

imposes a system which is not only dis

acts to demote people to the status of an object.

People

lose their complexity; the labeling sy stem simplifies what
was once a "living, breathing, complex human being," and

masking all other attributes of humann^tss, categorizeis them
according to their obligation to the

St ate.

Handmaids are

no longer women; instead, their label designates their

societal function, and limits all otheit'

attributes.
■

recognizes this when she states, "We aif e
purposes . . . We are two-legged wombs

vessels, ambulatory chalices" (176).

Handmaids, has lost her individuality

'

Ciffred
.

H' '

for breeding

that's all; jsacred

i$he, like the oliher
nd has, instead, been

subsumed under a "category" known by it;s label. (Also
noteworthy in this passage is Offred•s use of
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Scriptural"

discourse, the words "sacred vessels" and "chalices."
only has she lost her sense of Individ uality

Not

and identity,

she has also acquired the "language" of the regime and uses
it to define herself and her social funotion.)

Through language, Specifically in the act of renaming

and labeling, those in power in Gilead begin solidifying the
construction of a new world order.

This is not a

revolutionary idea; rather, what Atwood has done in the
novel (with the emphasis on renaming) is to illustrate the
fundamental human capacity to "name what is known;" pir, from

a Whorfian perspective, to "know" only
"named."

that which is

It is, as Whorf states, the way that humam

use

the "strange gift of language to Weaive the web of Maya or

illusion, to make a provisional analysis of reality and then
regard it as final" (Language; Thought^ and Realitv 263Y.

Naming weaves the web of illusion because through haming
things, people have the tendency to believe that the name in

fact is the entity; we may forget that words are symbb1ic
tools which help us to converse and communicate about:
"reality" and the world in which we live.

Furthermore5, this

act of naming is more of a social act than an individual

act; it is an agreement between individuals, in the form of
language, as to how "reality" or the external world w;Lll
perceived.

be

It is the way we make sense of our world.

Because the Gileadean ideology is foreign to the se

trapped within its walls, the inhabitants must rely on the
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new naming system to make sense of it.

are

indoctrinated into the new culture, and they begin to

learn

the rules governing the new culture through their lim ited
exposure to language.

labels.

They pay attention to names an i

■

In Gilead, then, naming becomes a particular Ly

effective way to begin defining the new environment, shaping
the political realm, and identifying (
i labeling) people with
their social roles.

Offred soon realizes, however, t lat

the

rules governing language, primarily the act of "naming,"
have changed.

In every culture, personal names are Sfbrongly

linked to an individual's identity.

Often, names are

"commonly associated with the physical

and moral

characteristics of their bearers . . . [and] they are
treated as bonds between an individual and the group" (Bram

41).

However, in Gilead, names which denote individuality

are banned.

Names of people and thing 3 no longer conyey

identity; rather, names denote social
duty.

tatus, rank, and

Offred, like the other Handmai is, is given a

patronymic, made of the possessive "of"

attached to the

Commander to whom her reproductive capabilities have been

designated.

Since she is consigned to a high ranking

officer named Fred, her new name is Offred.

She has been

renamed and her name means, literally, "the property of
Fred."

In this transition, she not on Ly loses a sense of

identity, she also loses a sense of hexself as "
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-«f- II •
e<:

because she is deemecJ "property," she becomes objectified in
the most extreme and devaluative sense of the word.

with the los^ of her proper name and thrbugh thb
subsequent renaming process, the society explicitly

j

proclaims that a woman (particularly a Handmaid) belo;ngs not
to herself but to ahother.

Offred tries to accept this'"'

transition, for the sake of survival, but she never is able

to forget the strong borid between her past name and lb'er
identity, as shown in the following passage:

i

My name isn't Offred, I have another name, which nobody
uses now because it's forbidden,

I tell myself it

doesn't matter, your name is like youf telephondsj
number, useful only to others; but what I tell in:

is wrong, it does matter. (108)
Names do matter, not only in her past life, but even )tiore,
in the present.

But in Gilead, she is no longer nameii; she

is labeled and with that label comes a
self.

Loss of

She reveals this loss of self— not only her id:

but the power and freedom of self-definition—in the ;Lines,
"I feel transparent . . . I feel as if there's not mui::h

left

of me . . . as if I'm made of smoke, as if i'm a mirage"

(110).

With the loss of her name, a 1OSS of identity ,

and a

loss of personal freedom, she seems to begin to fade into

nothingness.

As inhumane as these language abuses are, however, the
practice of renaming in Gilead goes far beyond changing
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personal names and labelihg.

Because

speech is so cl|Osely

related to thought, and particularly because

knowledg|e is

proliferated through the written word, the Gileadean
government is quite threatened by lahguage's accessibiility
If people have access to language, it is assumed, they also

have access to an unlimited array of ideas—-to knowledge and

thought—'and thinking "subjects" are more likely to stage a
revolt than unthinking "objects."

Therefore,

the worjd is

highly guarded; no one but the most pojwerful have acc|ess to
the written word.

In this manner, peo pie are truly

alienated; they are alienated from others, isolated wafchin
the world of their own minds

, one of the c|lief

means of bridging the gap between self

and others—

"commune"-ication in the most literal jsense—-is no lo'iiger
accessible to anyone but the most powerful.

The inaccessibility of language i:n Gilead is esp^
apparent in the Commander•s ritualized reading from the
Bible before The Ceremony.

In this scene. Offred informs us

that, "The Bible is kept locked up. . . It is an ihcei

device:

who knows what we'd make of it, if we ever gbt our

hands on it?" (112). In Gilead, The Word (not only tiie
Scriptures, but all language) is guarded.

Those in power,

those who make the rules, know the pow<2f of language iand

fear its allusiveness.
meaning.

They fear the proliferation c:

This is best illustrated in Offred's statement,

"We can be read to from it, by him, but we Gannpt read''
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(112).

The Word has a single interpretation in Gileac

which is professed as the "literal" interpretation,

jut',

which is really only the interpretation of those in pcower.
Offred soon realizes that the source of the Commander'
|''s

power is language, evidenced in her line, "He has som€ething

we don't have, he has the word" (114).

The Commanderi

not

only "has the word," but also has the power of

interpretation—of choosing and assigni
ing meaning to
words—and because of this he has choice, he has freedom, he

has power.
One of the most serious ramificati
ions of being denied

access to the word, as Offred soon fing:s> is that when words

are misused, or phrases misquoted or e /en fabricated, she
and the others have no way of "proving

the deception

There is no way to cross reference: th<^se in power cap
construct a society through fabricated Biblical references,

and can incorpGrate laws which purport to have Scriptural
precedents, and no one can argue with them.

this type of blatant deception occurs

One example of

at the Center where

the Handmaids were first indoctrinated into the new culture.

Offred remembers that a tape recording

of the Beatitudes was

played every day, tape recorded by amale, Offred tells us,
so that "even the Aunts wouldn't be guiIty of the sin of
reading" (114).

One which struck her

and didn't "sound right" was "Blessed

s particularly odd
re the silent."

This, of course, is not found in the Sc:riptures; it iss a
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command that was to be imposed on the women, but bhiyl under

the guise of Scriptural authority/
has ho way of proving it.

Offred knows thiisl, but

She says, "I knew they madis that

up, I knew it was wrong, and they left things out, too, but
there was no way of checking" (115).

The lack of acc|ess to

the word—both printed and spoken—equals a lack of power in
Gilead.

It also equates to a lack of thought, and a

resultant lack of "self."

Control of language, then, becomes control of the way
the

individual views the world and the way in which society

is constructed.

Because Offred*s language is limited;, her

world view is limited, and in a surprisingly short time
(as Offred says, "It has taken us so 1ittle time to change

our minds" [38]) she has begun the probess^
re-contextualization, or re-socialization.
survive within this culture. Offred has

must somehow learn, if not accept, the
the culture.

of

\; I

In order to

learned that she

official ideolc)gy of

Wheira the official ideoli>i•gy and the lane uage

of the culture merge is in the imposition of the offii ial
ideology on society.

In The Social and

Contexts of Language, Robert St. Clair suggests that 1: he

ideology of a culture is generally imposed by those in power
through linguistic manipulatibh such as "labeling oth

deviant, legitimizing the knowledge of those in power
and establishing barriers to social mobdility through

language" (27).

As has been shown pre^viously, Gilead.
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rs

as

imposes its ideology in all of these ways:

through 1

and renaming, through legitimizing the knowledge of tlose
power by allowing only the powerful access to reading

in

and

writing (hence knowledge-making)> and through restrie ting
the use of language among the inhabita nts

which resul ts.'

their alienation from others and in stifling what the

know about society and about themselve .

rank in society are static and chances

in O\/',

can

Their ppsit -on

for social mob

and

lity

are nil.

The power structure in Gilead doei

not stop at

labeling, renaming, and iimiting communication, however.
their attempt to construct a new socieby,

In

those in poyer in

Gilead have either renamed or "un"-hamled locations ariq
events as well as peoplei

This is shown most nbticea]ii)ly

when Offred notices that the name of a clothing store has

been painted over.

She remembers that the store (a shop

where the Handmaids order their dresses:, or "habits") was

once named "Lilies of the Field." Sincije

the name was

obiiterated, it is now only known by it
i s huge wooden sign in
the shape of a lily.

Offred responds

o this further

restriction of language by stating, "[T]hey decided that
even the names of shops were too much temptation for us.

Now places are known by their signs ale ne" (33).
well as people, have been demoted to

Plades, as

e status of a sign,

Words are outlawed because with the written word comes' a
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growth in thought and in consciousness, both of whichl

are

feared by the powerful in Gilead.

Another instance of renaming is seen when Offred

and

her shopping companion, another Handmaid named Ofglen

walk

along the street to do their daily, ritiia1ized shopping.
They come to the store called "Loaves and Fishes" whi"h is

marked (denoted) by a "wooden sign, a fish with a smi Le
eyelashes."

Offred states that she is

and

lured to the s zore

by

"the picture of succulent white fillets in the window'

(213).

The sign serves more than one purpose, hoWevet.

it

is not only in the window to "lure" customers to the store;
it also serves to indicate whether or not the items (in this

case, the fillets) are in stock.

As 0ffred explains, "They

put the picture in the window when they have something, take
it away when they don't.

Sign language" (213).

OffrM'S

reference to "sign" language here is m ore

than a

words,

of Gilead's

Rather, it is a strong indication

on

regression from a mode of communicatind through symbo: s
more primitive mode of communicating through signs

to a

use

the word "primitive" here in a very literal
sense^—particularly to define the constrictive effect

inherent in communicating through sign 3 as opposed to

the

liberating effects inherent in communi'mating through
symbols.

In "Sign and Symbols," Susanne Langer offers an
extensive definition which distinguishes the differences
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between signs and symbols.

A sign, Langer points out,

IS

"anything that announces the existence Or the immanence

some event . . . it is always a part qf the situation
which it refers" (Bloom 529).

of

to

Signs, therefore, requ ire

little interpretation or thought; theyi are closely bo'und
their referent.

to

Animals, most notably, communicate t irough

signs (a dog bark "signals" a physical neted or "signci,Is"
immanent danger), but these patterns cf "communication"

are

no more or less than direct stimulus-r esponse reactions.

conditioned through time, whose meanir[g directly Corr
to stimuli experienced at the present.

Therefore,

"communication" through signs is a behavioi: closely related
to a Skinnerian stimulus-response reaction.

Furtheririore,

sign is always situated in the immediate present.

a

Signs are

bound by time and by place; as Langer states, they cause a
response "in the face of the thing signified" (531).

They

are primitive, conditioned responses to the environment
present.

They never refer to the futu re because signs

"always embedded in reality, in a present that emerges
the actual past" (531).

at

are

from

Because there is a direct

correlation between the sign and the s

gnified, sign^^

refer to something at present, and are the only ways that

animals respond to their environment,

In this manner

animals are prisoners of an immediate reality; they cannot
conceptualize alternative realities.

26

Although humans also respond to t he environment through

sigfh-using behavior (we stop at fed li ghts, we answer bells,
we evacuate buildings in response to fire alarms), wd also,
-

■ .

:

.

■ ■' ■

I

and primarily--both in a qualitative and quantitativ(E^
sense—use symbols to communicate.

In

contrast to

sign-using, stimulus-response ways of reacting to the^

environment, humans have the ^unique calpacity for using and
formulating symbols which are not tied to an immediati

present, nor necessarily to the thing signified.

as Langer asserts, "they serve to liberate
immediate stimuli of a physically pfesent

iristead^

humans fro;m the

[and]

World . .

allow us to think about the thing symbolized" (531).

Symbols, therefore, allow thought because they allow

for

conceptualization of possible alternative

ions as

to what the symbol "means."

Symbols never

"mean"

on

one

thing, as signs do; rather, they "suggest" a range of
meanings because they can be "combined and varied in
thousand ways, the result of which is

a symbolic strujcture

whose meaning is a complex of all respective meaningsi
(531).

Symbols, therefore, bring to mind a wide rang^ of

possible meanings.

They do not cause a simple stimulus-

response reaction, but allow and even demand thought

oecause

of their inherent complexity.
Symbols also mark a fundamental boundary between animal
forms of coirimunication and human forms of communicatiSon.

Langer states, "Animals thinks but the y think of and
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it

As

■ .

things; [people] think primarily about things" (531).

This

ability to conceptualize, to be libergted from an ipniediate
physical environment, to be able to fcrmulate alternative

"meanings" are (iistihctly human ways of "making sense" of
the past and present, but even more im;portantly, they allow

us to think about and plan for the future.

Symbols, then,

are not bound to time and place as are signs.

They allow us

to think beyond what has been and what is to what may
possibly be.

And the chief means for

transforming" our experiences is through language.

As

Langer states, "The birth of language is the dawn of

humanity. . . The essence of language IS symbolic, not
signific; we use it first and most vit

hold ideas in our own minds" (533).

to formula te and

T tie ability to
is, wtiat ■

manipulate and formulate the symbols o
separates humans from animals.

ThrOughi the use of symbols,

humans have the unique capacity for

^

. I-

•

ught, something which

allows us to ponder, question, hope, a:id dream about things

not in our immediate physical or temporal

environmentJ

However, with the regression from symbolization •

o

signification in Gilead, a resultant regression in th jught,
and moreover, in humanness. begins to occur. And the|
irocess
of deconstruction continues.

In Gilead, not only has the

government limited access to the written word, it has

deemed it necessary to signify a direc
the sign and the signified.

also

correlation b< tween

As shown in Offred•s reference

28

to "sign language," a picture of a fish is a fish.

picture (sign) of a fish is hot in th^
not exist beyond the window.

In the

If the

window, the fish does

ame manner, the woman

who once existed before the time of Gi
ilead has been

deconstructed; her name is no longer

here, and as far as

the Gileadeans are concerned, she no longer exists.

In Gilead, signs, rather than syir bols, have becOTe the

means by which "reality" is known. Ttijere

is no room for

interpretation; in Gilead, signs have replaced the symbolic
aspects of language.
are "what they are."

In this society, it appears, things
Ambiguity is treason.

of meaning is prohibited.

Prolifhiratidn

The powerfu1 have begun

reconstructing society and replacing subjects with objects,
symbolic meaning with literal meaning, fluidity with
rigidity, and consciousness with noncohsciousness.

What appears to be happenihg with this transition ffditi
symbols to signs is a type of breakdow n, or regression from,
what Walker Percy, in Lost in the Cosm os;

The Last Self

Help Book, has termed "triadic" relati Dnships.

Triadfi-c

relationships, as the name implies, reguire three,

irreducible elements for any communica tive act:

an object, and a symbol (or word) whic 1
object.

a speaker,

refers to the

This symbol is not the object itself, but only the

name of the object which brings to min<^

(or forms in the

consciousness) a concept of the object in a person's mind.
However, becanse language is restricted
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and words are

replaced by "signs," most meaning-inaking in Gilead

approaches what Percy terms "dyadic" relationships;

direct interaction between a single sijgn

a

and an organism—a

type of relationship which allows for no choices, no

other

possibilities, but only a direct stimu lus-response re action.

Meaning-making through the use of dyad ic

>s ■ is

indicative of an organism which survives in its envirlonment

through the mode of stimulus-response,
it requires no thought.

It is simplis bic

and

It is the worId lacking in 1:.;ioughb

and consciousness^-it is the world of animals wherein

action is only a response to a signal
In fact, it is not even a world.

each

from the environment,

It ie an environment in

the most literal sense, one in which there

are no

alternatives for acting, one in which choices are limited,
one in which every action is a direct result of a single
stimulus: the sign.

It is a world laccing in thought•

lacking in emotion, lacking in consqioiasness.

It is

:he

world of Gilead, where people have been demoted tb organisms
within an environment.

It is the beginning of a world of

non-consciousness.

In Gilead, where the covert goals are to force people

to accept the new regime without question arid deconsttuct

consciousness, the most evident place to begin restricting

human thought is language. However, b^ acting under •i:;he
illusion that language can only display literal meaning, the
government refuses to acknowledge that language is primarily
30

a symbolic system.

By limiting language to a system of

signs, those in power deny the fact th at "language is

symbolic meaning system--it is a system composed mainly of

symbols that are used to communicate meaning from onei mind
to another" (Gasson 13).

Therefore, language not

requires symbols, it also requires an interaction between
individuals who create and communicate

meaning with those

symbols.

Ironically, what those in power did not seem to i ealize

when they tried to stifle language is ■j^hat once peopl#
accept the illusion that language is a qbmmodity and c an

be

restricted and stifled, the effects criss all social,

political, and economic boundaries.

O^fred realizes this

early on when commenting on the effect these changes lave

had on one of the most influential pebple to bring about the

current changes in language and in socj.ety:
Wife of her Commander.

Serena Joy, the

Offred notes that before Gilead Was

a reality, Serena had been on the lecture circuit, making
speeches about "the sanctity of the home [and] how women
should stay at home" (60).

But Offred notes the

contradiction in Serena's past life anel her present life:
in her "past life," (her life before G2lehd) Sereha hairisel.fi
had had a career, of sorts, giving these speeches.

Hdwe^^er/

Offred notices that how the Gilea^ean concept has iDecome a
reality, Serena "stays in her home, but it doesnVt seiS

agree with her" (61) . Seeing the immeii|se gap that lies
■31

between Serena's intent and her effect:, Off

state

"How

furious she must be, now that she's bfsen taken at her

(61).

word"

In Gilead, the society oppressess the oppressors

as

well as the oppressed because all is t:aken literally
meaning is stifled^ when the illusion

When

that each word

has a

distinct and literal meaning is belie'vfed, and when
interpretation is outlawed, then language loses the
force which gives it life.

ymbolic

When language dies, know],edge

dies. And when meaning is stifled, ncj) one can escape

the

oppression.

It is exactly the type of environment constructe d

in

Gilead, through the limitations placecl on language, w hich
stifles the knowledge of the inhabitants and also the

society as whole.

In The Development[of Perception.

Cognition. and Lahauaae. van Geert des'cribes the resuIt of

this type of environment:

"In an environment without

alternatives for acting, there is nottiing to know or

to

believe, since the conditions for expressing the know ledge
or the belief . . . are absent" (237).

In Gilead, the

conditions for expression which are aJ:)sent, and whose

absence effectively diminishes the cocrnitive growth of

the

populace, are the outward manifestaticms of language:
reading, writing, and conversation,

By placing such

extreme restrictions on language, the society of Gile ad

remains controlled, dominated by forcei and oppressiori

and

lacks the flexibility necessary for ariy society to achieve
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growth.

This society, which bases it4

struoture on c

interpretation of a single text, quickly and dangeroi:sly

writes itself into rigidity.

Ironically, this spclet y, ■

whose purported goal is to iinpiement

■

"higher morality" (in

the Moral Majority sense of the wprd)

ty in

both cognitive development and, what developmental

psycho1ogist Lawrence KhoIberg would

refer to as, mox al

development.

Interestingly, Gilead provides a lucid example cf

fourth stage in Kohlberg•s six stage schema
development.

the

of moral

Gilead is locked within the stage that

Kohlberg defines as "social system and

conscience" wliich

appears at the second level of the thr ee hierarchical

that he believes are necessary in the development of

meaning-making.

moral

Psychologist Robert %egan states tha t.

"Kohlberg•s stage four resolve[s] the historic conflict

between the individual and the group b y deciding
for the group" (63).

In this stage, the

state takes

primacy

over all; individuality is subsumed in order to creat3

state.

the

At this stage of social/moral development, the

historic individual-versus-group dichotomy has disappeared
and has been replaced by an all-encompassing, oppressive
society.
The oppression that occurs in Gilead is illustrative of
the type of oppression one would expect to find in any "real
world" society based on a strict adherence
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to a "law-and

order" ideology.

In

Kohlberg's hiers.

, it is a point in

moral development where people have b4come

Social obiiects,

rather than individual subjects, who, as Kegan states

are not guaranteed their distinctlness apart from their
identification with the social or der.

four is essentially the psychplog ical

ideology, which is a meaning system

Kohlberg
birth of

which is abd ve all

factional . . . This ideology ten^ds to draw linds

of

membership in the human community according to ti le
particular faction it makes ultim.ate, creating

lat

Erikson (1972) called the "pseudo-species." (63 y
As with many fundamentalists, those who

"make the rules" and

structure the Gileadean society are "moralists"
extreme sense:

their ideology is rigid

in th£ most

and inflexible

because, as Kohlberg's model illustrates, their ideolpgy is
factional and does not allow for individual distinct!^Dns.

There is no individual identity because

all is identi ied

with the group and the reigning ideology.
exclusionary in the most rigid sense:

This socie :y is

those who disagree

with, or challenge, the dominant ideology in Gilead are
exiled or executed.

There is no room for dissension

The power structure of Gllead, loeked in KohIberg's Law

and Order stage of moral development,

seems to assume that

if individuals think individual thoughts, or if they have or
construct any identity apart from the group, the socidty~or
"pseudo-species"~wil1 deteriorate-
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Individuality poses the

most extreme threat to the Gileadean society, which suggests

why such stringent controls have been

placed on langnjiage.

Controlling language is the means by v|rhich the ideology of
the new society is constructed and ma ntained, while at the

same time, individuality, identity, and
are targeted for deconstruction.
control is the chief iiteana W^

"self" consc1ousness

In Gilead, language
ttke group wages war

against the self.
Although Offred is subjected to the dehumanizinci forces
of the Gileadeans, she does, in many ways, resist th^ir

efforts to deconstruct her.

As Chaptir 2 will deinonfftrate,

she resists complete deconstruction b^ utilizing inn€ir
language and the limited access she hcis to written arid

spoken language.

Chapter 2 will also further explore;: the

dichotomies of self/other, social/indi.vidual, and
male/female—with a specific emphasis

on how all of these

dichotomous systems relate to knowing

and being--and |how

language acts as the bridge between tliese disparate
entities.

In particular, it will explore

the social nature

of language, and how society plays a nliajor role in
constructing the consciousness of the individual.
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CHAPTER 2

RECONSTRUCTION AND RENEWAL

The [person] who writes a seriou4

novel about the end

of the world—i.e., the passing f one age and the
beginning of another—must redkpn not merely like H.G.
Wells with changes in the enyirori:ment, but also with
changes in [human] consciousness which may be quite as
radical.

Walker Percy
"Notes for a Novel about the; End of the World"

Offred's immersion into the foreign and hostile I

environment of Gilead has subjected her to the process of

deconstruction.
nothing.

From society's perspective, she has become

She has lost her past identity; past ways'

knowing have been invalidated, and ways of making senlse of
the world through language have been restricted.

become an object, useful only as a means

Shel has

to a social end.

However, through Offred's narrative, Atwood demonstrates

that there are ways to transcend this state of nothingness,

ly a victim of L cruel

She does not allow Offred to become on

world.

Instead, she writes of one woman's determination to

transcend and rebel against society's efforts to dehiimanize
her and deconstruct her consciousness

Although there are

times when Offred feels that she will fade into nothi:igness,

she continues to question the regime— although this i 5

often

limited to internal questioning—and cDntinues to exp Lore
and define "where in reality" she live

She strives to

make sense of her self and the externa 1 world through
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1

language^ and in this way resists com;plete decOnstruptiOn
and begins the process of reconstruct ng her conscicaisness
and her self.

The chief obstacle that Offred confronts in her

reconstructive process is her inabilityy to access language.
■

i

The "sins" of reading and writing are punishable by death in

Gilead, because with reading and writing
of multiple points of view and a growth
self.

come an awareness

of the indivjidUal

The power to write one's self i s the power to

challenge authority.

Because the Gilc:adean governmeir

restricts both the written and spoken word. Offred longs for

communication.

She misses language, she misses words, and

throughout the novel, she "plays" with words, trying to

remember the multiplicity of meanings and seemingly endless
connotations that derived from words she used in her past

life.

Many times in the novel, she mu 11s over meanings and

savors the connotative power of words.

For instance, when

she considers the word "chair>"she thinks beyond the

literal meaning, beyond the sign, and penetrates the symbol:
I sit in the chair and think about the word chair.
can also mean the leader of a mee

mean a mode of executipn.
the word charity.

It

It can ajlso

It is the first syllal Die

in

It is the French word for flesh

(140)

In this passage, Atwood vividly illustrates

how the hiaman

mind "plays" with words, how word-symbols convey seem Lngly
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endless meanings, and how, through a

sort of free-

association, they allow us to think

of

at once, things which don't readily

apipeaf--at

many different, things

surface level—-to be connected in any way.

least on a

As Offrcid

states (regardihg the previous passag4), "None of these
facts has any connections wfth the others"

sense, she's right:

the facts have no

(140). ill bhe
conneGbion

with one another, except that they all. have been brought to
consciousness by the word-symbol chair

On the other hand,

they do serve to illustrate an importe.nt way that the mind
connects things through patterning.

11 of the •'facts" (or

associations) that arise in her consci ousness are triggered

by the word chair, just as in the proc ess

of free-

association, one word will trigger ancther, then another,
Free-association, then, is the exact opposite of the type of

cognitive "patterning" that the Gileadea:n government strives
to implement.

Those in power strive for a patterning-system

which simplifies thought and restricts alternative ways of

viewing the world through limiting eonnotative and/or
symbolic meaning.

They seem to be striving for a pfinciple

of uniform thinking among people, similar to the principle

of Praonanz in Gestalt psychology whic1

states that

recognize patterns by reorganizing stimuli to make thism

simpler, more complete, and more regular than they actually
are" (Woolfolk 238).

This way of perc iving the world,

through recognizing patterns among diverse stimuli and
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forming a simpler, mofe complete, men^al
is a natural cognitive process.

It

i£5

essential to making sense of the wbrlci

construct of them,

a process which is
since it is

difficult, if not impossible, to attei|i'd

bo the multitude of

individual stimuli with which We are constantly bomb rded.

However, when taken to an extreme, thi.s way of thinking
have a reverse effect:

rather than h€iIpirig

can

an individual

to

form connections, it can limit the po^sible alternati.
"constructs" for meaning.

Rather thari •'simplifying" through

reordering the world, enforcing a syst.em

connections has the effect of making

which "dictates"

he world "simp!istic."

Ironically, however, what Offred appears to be dioing
while "playing" with the word chair is actually the r everse

of Praqnanz:

rather than forming patt erns

from diver}se

stimuli to simplify and "regulate" her world, she makes
■ ■ '
' ■
^ ■ ■
i
world more complex by conjuring up a ariety of ment-a1

images with Only one symbol, the word chair.

her

This pr ocess

of making the simplistic more cbmplex--of actually
constructing alternatives for a single symbol—is one^
example of how Offred rebels against the

social norms and

against society's effort to deconstruct her consciousness,

Here, she begins the process of reconstructing her

consciousness through the use of language.
Offred reveals the purpose bf this word play in another
way, stating,

"These are the kinds of litanies I use, to

compose myself" (140).

Thus, through language, Offred
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"Gomposes" herself, both in the familiLar sense of "ca Iming"

or "quieting" herself and ih the essential sense of

arranging or putting tbgether the separate "parts" or
elements of her consciousness (or as she says, my "sbIf") to

make complex, yet complete, whole.

Through the intei nal

manipulation of language, Offrfed resists fra(^entatioh, b^^
deconstruction, and strives to remain whole and comp;,ete.

Through Offred's narratiye, Atwocj>d also confronl^s and
explores the nature of psychological development and

cognitive growth.

The tension caused by the oppositionaT,

dualistic relationships that Offred continually confi onts,
particularly the contrast between the past and the present,
becomes the catalyst for Offred's reccinstructive process.
Reconstruction in this sense can be seen as a process ■

of

adaptation to a new environment which centers on, in

Piagetian terms, the complementary processes of assimilation
and accommodation to reach a state of

In the

process of assimilation, Offred strives to "fit" the
language, customs, and rules of her ne w world into he

existing cognitive schemes.

In order to survive, she

re-encultrate herself; she must make sense of the new

However, just as in any process of cog nitive

must

world.

or

psychological developiiient, this foreig h information ni ust
accommodated into her existing cognitive

schemes.

Be cause

these schemes act to organize information and show

relationships between and among things, a way Of
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be

,

"patterning" the world and making sen^e

of reality. Offred•s

existing cognitive structures must be a1tered in order to
assimilate this new information.

In :his sense, the

narrative can be seen as a record df Offred's process of

striving for equilibration, a process defined by cognitive
psychologists as the search for "a ba

ance between or.e's

cognitive schemes and one's experiences

or perceptions of

the environment . , . Eguilibration i$ the process b3| which
actual changes in thinking take place

(Woo1folk 581).

In

the process of equilibration, changes in thinking take place

because in striving for a balance betv^een

old and new

information, there are often parallel changes in perci
ways of patterning information, and ways of making sense

the world.

of

This process of equilibrat ion is vividly

illustrated in Offred's attempts to re-learn
of both her new world and also her seIf

and mak€5

Reaching a

sense

state

of equilibration is essential to adapt ation, and for
purposes of this paper, will serve to illustrate Off:r ed's
process of reconstruction.

Reconstruction, then, must take into

ways of knowing and ways of making sense

account bot ti

of the world

new (possibly antithetical) information and new ways
patterning that information in order to

past
and

of

make sense of it.

Because her present world is in direct opposition to

ler

past world. Offred must alter her ways of processing

information, of makihg sense of the worid.

Therefore, much

of Offred'sreconstruGtive process re yolves around working

through the tension caused by striving to forget her
life and, at the same time, trying to remember it.

■I or

instance, when she smells the yeast from freshly baked

bread, it reminds her of herself in
was a mother.

past life whc n

she

As she remembers the t;bme before, she states,

"This is a treacherous smell, and I

(62).

h«j:r

know I must shut it out"

Offred's past memories are "tr^sacheroUS"

distinct senses.

in two

First, they are Untrustworthy becai se

she

can no longer identify her self with those memories;:

she

must learn to shut them out in order to tolerate her

new

life of oppression.

But in another sense, these memories

equate with the Gileadean concept of

treachery" becciuse

remembering her past life--and in the

process acknow;!

that there was any life, particularly a "better" 1if€i

Gilead^-equates with disloyalty in th^ regime.

in

before

But even

though the past is too painful to remiember, and her ii:iemories

of it are untrustworthy. Offred knows that she must i:emember
her past life in order to resist society's efforts to
deconstruct her.

Therefore, when she

can no longer <|i

remember her husband and daughter, sh^
and says, "It's my fault.

becomes fruStriated

I am forgetting too much" (250).

Constantly bombarded by memories of the past, when things

were "normal," she strives to shut th^m

out in order to

endure the abnormalities of Gilead; y<et, at the same time,
she knows that she must continue to remember, to reca;pture
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her past life—-even in itiemories^-in

hopes

that she will one

day be reunited with her loved ones and her past life.

In

this way, sh® continues to hope that she will one day
prevail.

■

••

■

■

■

■

'

■■■■
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i•
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Through the process of reconstrU'ction.

■

.

; . ■ .■ ■ '

Offred milst live

in the space between forgetting and remembering.

Shcl must
ion in order

strike a balance and reach a state of

to make sense of her self in an alien world.

And

Ij

language--both internal and external- is her chief mcians for

reaching a state of equilibration, whd.ch

is, in psychologist
v J|;-'

Robert Kegan's words
[T]he ongging conversatiort between the individuating

organism and the world, a process of adaptation shaped
by the tension between the assimllation of new

experience to the old 'grammar'

and the accommodation

of the old grammar to new experienee.

(44)

Equilibration (or the search for balance), therefore
"shaped" by the tension between the oppositional and

is
often

contradictory forces of past "knowledge" and present
understanding.

In Offred's case, it i s the search fgr .V' 

"balance" between the antithetical constructs of her past

memories and her piresent experiences.
Sometimes, as Offred•s narration demonstrates, p,ast

ways of knowing, or the "old grammar," are no longer :valid
constructs for making sense of the worId at present,
Therefore, new schemes must be constru cted, new ways I of
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perceiving and understanding the world must be formec ,

in

Thl oughout

order for the "adaptive conversation" to emerge.

the novel. Offred must adapt he:r past ways of "makiriiG

sense"

of the world to new ways of making sense of what appears to
I

be a senseless world.

In the past, her language allc>wed for

metaphorical connections which connected disparate events
and/or entities and allowed each to comment on the ot her.
In this way, meaning Was allowed to multiply; it resi sted

clear, concrete descriptiveness.
is limited to the literal.

However, in Gilead. meaning

Each sign

correlation to its signified, a situation wherein

proliferation of meaning is halted anci events, language, and
emotions become rigidified.
This enormous tension between her past memories

and

present experiences forces Offred intc a psychologica;1
of disequilibrium.

In order to strike a balance, she

state

must

learn new ways of comprehending and processing the external

world.

However, ways of doing this through language

limited in Gilead.

are

This restrictive meaning-making

environment is clearly depicted when 0ffred strives t;o make
sense of the a man who hangs from a hook on the Wall,

executed for his past crimes against ttie state.

(The

picture of a fetus which hangs around tiis neck signif;:res
that he was a doctor who performed abortions in his 1 Lfe

before Gilead.)

She states that she sees what looks Like a

"smile made of blood" seeping from the
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dead man's mouth onto

the bag which covers his head.

Offred begins to make sens^^^^

of this image as, it is assumed, she would have done in the
pre-Gileadean world.

She strives to comprehend the

significance of this image, and at first, relies on l:pr old
"grammar"—-connecting unrelated image£> through the u$e of

metaphor~to make sense of itv

ThiS; d

her i

statement, "The red of the smile is the same as the red of

the tulips in Serena Joy's garden" (4S).

However, almost

immediately, she stops herself from mcLking the connection

and begins to see the images as disconnected and unrelated.
She states, "The red is the same but "tLhere is no connection.

The tulips are not tulips of blood, tlie red sffiiles are not
flowers, neither thing makes a comment on the other" (45).

As shown in these lines, Offred's state of disequilitirium—
her inability to adapt the old "grammar" to new expeiiience-
forces her to abandon the metaphor.

It is as if metaphors

are no longer valid constructs for meaning-making; like most
everything else in Gilead, they have become untrustworthy.
So instead of relying on metaphor, Of

red "reads" the!

scene

literally and states.

Each thing is valid and really th|«ere.

It is thrbugh

such valid objects that I must picck my way every day
and in every way.
such distinctions.

I put a lot of effort into ma!icing
I need to makee them.

very clear/ in my own mind.
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I needi to be

This passage illustrates the tensiorji

which exists between

Offred's past weiys of making sense of experience and her

present, 1imited ways of making sense of experience.

Gilead, with the emphasis on denotaticj)n
metaphors are scandalous because they

In

and "correctness,"

cannot be "read

literally. As Walker Percy states/ fifom

the point of view

of scholastics and semioticists, a metaphor is "scandialbus"

becavis® it appears to be wrong.

Logically, a metaphor seems

like a "mistake" because "it asserts

ne thing that is

something else-^and further, that its [significance] often

seems proportionate to its wrongness

ir outlandishnes

("Metaphpr as Mistakew 67).

Metaphorical cphneCtions, tterefc re, because of their
poetic nature and their ability to go beyond the 1itesral

meaning, are dangerous ways to make se|nse of the worljd in
Gilead.

If Offred had Contihued to ma:ke sense of this scene

through a metaphoriGal cpnstruct, it m ay have suggested, or

offered profound insight into, the "meaning" or significance
of the man's death.

The two otherwise

unrelated conqepts

might then have "commented" upon one another and Offted

would have gained a fuller insight not

only of the iijlacfe

e, how this im^ge

before her, but in a more general sens

"comments" on other aspects of her worId and her existence.
If she were to use her past ways of "making sense" of the

world in Gilead, she might risk her own sanity because these
two things (the dead man and the healthy, living tulips)
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when connected, not only comment on Iffe in Gilead, but
raise extremely important questions about what is valued and
nurtured in Gilead, and what is devalued and easilyjdisposed
of within the regime.

However, because of the unconscibnable horror o::
Gilead, Offred stops short of cohnecting these concepts.
instead, she makes a concerted effort to perceive eaeh thing
for what it is in concrete, actual, "/alid," and especially
literal terms.

She has been trained

"bo perceive the world

in this manner, focusing on individua1 concrete aspects
rather than on making metaphorical co inections.
Furthermore, it seems that this way of disconnecting;

concepts from symbolic meanings enables her to deal With the
horrors and atrocities of Gilead, bee ause through distancing

the language used to describe and make
she simultaneously distances her self

sense of the icene,

from the scene,

Concrete, literal thinking enables her to "process"
information in an objective, unfeeling manner, which;!is
necessary for her self-preservation,

In fact, Offred
■ A, ' .

'• • ,

■ , ;t

states, "What I feel toward them is blankness.
is that I must not feel" (44).

She h as learned

must see the dead man as "a valid object,"

object herself, in order to endure th e

-■

she

and feel I jas an

horror of Gilsad.

Therefore, through forgetting he r past and dist.ancing
. ■ ■

■■

■

■

' ■ i

■ ■

herself from the Gileadean atrocities, Offred strives to

tolerate and endure her oppression.
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•

What I feel

To preserve her self.

she strives not only to forget her past, but also her

present:

she tries not to feel anythihg and in this j way,

alienates her self from the external world.

However] in

illustrating Offred's tendency toward apathy, Atwood

does

not suggest that it came about only because of the Giieadean
regime.

Rather, she shows that Offred learned this taqtic

for dealing with the world as a child, well before h^r life
in Gilead.

In doing this, Atwpod shows that even "ordinary"

life, we cope by distancing ourselves from "reality*

and

furthermore, by separating our minds Jrrom our bodiesi
is evident in Offred's memory of how she learned not

This
to

feel:

Steel yourself, my mother used td say/ before
examinations or swims in cold water.

I never tii ought

much at the time about what the phrase meant, btit
had to do with meta,l, with armor,
would do, I would steel myself,

it

and that's what I

I would pretend not to

be present, not in the flesh. (^06)
This pretending, this Cartesian mentality of severin

body

from mind, is one Way in which people (both in dystopias

in the "real world") survive.

and

In Gildad, this form qf

protecting the self, in the form of mental escape, is

the

way in which most people, from the mosjt powerful to t: he
least, are able to survive.

In fact, Offred states that she

is not alone in this form of escape, illusionary as i|t may
be.

The irony is that the Commander, she notices, embraces
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the body/mind duality as well, when bley must uridergb the
ritual of the Ceremony, as evidenced'In offred's line,

This State of absenbe, of existi^g

apart from the body,

had been true of the Commander too.

. .the sexuhl act,

although he performed it in a pe functory way, must
have been largely uncohscious fo:

himself.

him, like scratching

(206, 207)

In Gilead, the way to endure is to abandon
simultaneously abandon consciousness,

The oharactefs have

quite literally objectified themselye^,
the most intimate of experiences.

the self cind

other people,, and

On y in this way, of

seeing everything as object and nothing as subject, can they
disassociate themselves from the world

themselves.

and Ultimately from

Only in this way can they endure.

As objects,

they survive; as conscious, feeling subjects, they risk
sanity and hope.
Although Offred is tempted to accept the body/mind.

subject/object Cartesian model, she resists defining
self from a dualistic perspective.

her

Instead, she pers ists in

trying to make connections and "fill j.n the spaces" between

the opposites.

She resists simplistic either/or patterns

of

"seeing" or "knowing" the world; she strives for a balance
between being and nothing.

She persiSits in becoming

more

than an object, but in doing so, realizes that she miist make
choices about her present situation and

her future.

These

choices are frightening however, becaiise they suggest;
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alternatives to the Gileadean wbrld-view.

choices equate with rebelliousness,
the choice that terrifies me.

In Gileadi,

As Offred says,

"It's

A way out, a salyatioh" (80).

Offred cannot trust the "salvation" offered by the

Gileadeans, one wherein people are "saved"~ particuiarly
through the hideous ceremony of Salvaging—^from a wo:cld

where free agents make free choices.

She cannot acce
apt the

Gileadean definition of "salvation" w:lerein

people nvuist

abandon their individuality and relinduish their selves for
the "common good" or a nebulous "latejr reward."

Instead,

Offred looks for ways that she can saye herself from

the

salvation offered by the regime.
In this effort, however. Offred ihust make choice

choices which themselves are terrifying.
ability to choose was one of the ways

In the past;, the

she defined hei Self

because with choice comes autonomy and freedom.

But in

Gilead, this means of self-definition is no longer

available.

Instead of autonomy, then, Offred relies

on

language to make sense of her world and to connect with
Others in an effort to reaffirm herse]f.

She relies

on

language, because language has the caEiacity to cOnnect

two

dispafate realities in the process of negotiating a
different reality.

It is this connect ive process and social

interaction that Offred strives for in an effort to tioth

endure and prevail, and to reconstruct her self in the new
world.
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Although most of Offred•s reconstructive process is
isolated within her own mind^—a constant process of

negotiating between past and ptesent "ways of knowip:
there are instances when others try to

connect with : ler and

break through her seif-imposed isblation.

One of tlx 2 first

of these instances involves her shopping partner Ofg Len, who
"tries out" the password to the Undergtound—"mayday
heir.

on

However, because Offred has learned to distrus: both

language and "bthers"^-in Gilead, botti may betray he;):—she
does not allow herself to enter into a dialogue with
Instead, she considers their form of communication as yet

another type of "sign" language, nothi
ing more than "

whispers, projected through the funnels of [their] wliite

wings" (260).

Their exchanges typify those which exi-st

in a

system of signs rather than symbols, ^s shown in Offi ed's
reference to their discourse as being "like a telegriim,
verbal semaphore.

Amputated speech" (260).

a

Because their

chances to engage in language are so i lighly limited.

and

also because of Offred's fear and distrust, the context of

their exchange does not allow for the emergence of miich

meaning-making.

As in a telegram or

semaphore, the code

or "sign" has ope meaning and one meai|iing alone,
Therefore, when Ofglen does try out the "mayday'
password. Offred considers, at first, only the liter<

meaning of the words.

Because she has

learned to limit

meaning-making to the direct response to a sign, she
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believes that Ofglen is truly remarkijng on the beautiful May
day.

It is only as an afterthought that she recalls that

the word has another meaning:

Mayday used to be a distress sighal, a long time ago.
It was Luke who told me about mayday. . .
It's French, he said.
Help me.

From m'aiLdez

(58)

Although Offred is able to go beyond the literal meaning
into the symbolic (or suggested) meanfng of the words/her
fear and distrust cause her to reject the "help me"

connotations of the discourse, and instead, she sett11 es
the literal meaning.

It is not until much later, whe n

for

the

women have formed a bond of trust, that Ofglen is able to

disclose the nature and function of the password.

Beicause

everything in Gilead is untrustworthy] and fear and
alienation separate people and disallc)w for communicdtion.
Ofglen and Offred must build a bond of trust before either

feel free to disclose their true feel^-ngs about the ifegime.
Therefore, although there are soriie opportunities for
Offred to engage in a dialogue and affirm both her sIf and

her true feelings about the regime, shie has undergone the

process of re-encultration and has learned that language not
only has the power to construct alternative realities, it

also has the power to confine. She has learned to distrust
metaphors, for they only magnify the horror of Gileaql

She

has learned to alienate and isolate herself from others, to
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the point that she can no longer trust their discourse
goals.

She has even learned that her

own

memories are

no

longer trustworthy, that everythihg is really a
reconstruction/ and that she must

on "concrete reality"

and "valid objects" to roaXe sense of tier new environment,
She has learned to respond to her env ironment as an animal

does, through atteriding to signs—to

he literal meanling

of

things-^rather than symbols, and to a /oid danger and
risk-taking at all costs.

She has ad pted to the

environment in such a way that passiv Lty and acceptance seem

to be the only alternatives to the ho:|rror

of Gilead.

On a surface level, Offred s®®ros to have accepted the

regime's efforts to deconstruct her

to a state of

nothingness,* yet at a deeper level,

she resists

deconstruction.

She continues in her quest to become more

than nothing; she Gbntinues the process of reconstructing
her self and strives for equilibration

Through this

process, she "fills in" the space betvreen

the two

dichotombus states (or conditions) of being and nothing.

In

direct opposition to the state of nothingness imposecil on her

by the regime is Offred's quest to recbnstruct her self,
which includes on one level, the need to adapt to the;

environment in order to survive, and

h another level,

embraces all aspects of being, a state wherein she strives

to redefine herself and empower herself in ah effort not
only to endure the horrors of Gilead, but to continue hoping
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that some day she will prevail.

These oppositional

states—nothing and being-^continual]y wage war and
for Supremacy within Offred.

It is

er constant strjuggle to

avoid being defined as nothing—whicti

the Giieadean j
■

"

power

: '1

structure wants so desperately for heir to accept—etl

instead all aspects of being, which \ividly illustra'tes

the

active, and often terrifying and confusing, process i Of

"Becoming," of reconstructing or redefining one's owl n

self.

By focusing on this process of psychelogical and ontj
growth, Atwood demonstrates how esser tial it is to d void

embracing either pole of a dichotomy,

She will not accept

either/or alternatives; she continues to explore and! write
the space between.

By immersing her character in bhe space in betft'ieen,
"

'

Atwood explores various alternative w.ays

ways of "being."

' '

■■

'

' 1

of "knowingi" and

By writing the space in between, sjhe

a1 process of mjaking

illustrates the fundamental ontologic.

sense of the world in relation to the self and the

simultaneous process of making sense
to the world.

of the self in relation

In doing so, Atwood de monstrates

her

for going beyond either/or alternative ways of knowirig,
defining, and describing the self and the world.

Tlijiroughout

the novel Atwood writes the spaces between dichotomies, not

only the being/nothing dichotomy, but also the dichojtomles
of subject/object, self/other, male/female, and social/
individual.
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Even though there are times in t:he

novel when £(f fred

tries to connect with others, for a 1arge part of th e

novel

she is limited to making sense of the atrocities in jiSilead
internally.

She does not have access

to external "w ays

of

knowing" (e.g., cqhVersation, reading and writing);|
therefore, her narrative is limited to what might bo defined

as an internal monologue.

However, as shown in her jLine

"You don't tell a story only to yourself. • There Vs. a[
someone else" (52), her narrative includes a strong isense of
"other-ness" and of the Social nature and function o;:E

language.

In this way, her Story mig tit

be
more ■ ■spec|
• ■ ■ ■;; ■ ■ .■■ ■
■ ■„ •■ • i

defined as an inteirnal dialogue, comp osed

of her vole:e from

the present, commented upon by intern alized

past, and directed to an imagined listener

"voices"| of

who acts

the

Ito

"affirm" the story in Offred•s very a ct of telling ii

With her emphasis on social intejraction, in coni
with "others" in the pursuit of negoti
Atwood demonstrates the dialogic nature of making meaning,

She implies that meaning cannot be

ived through a

monologue; it requires constant negotiation
an effort to procure an agreed upon

aning.

me

continuing dialogue which constantly

It is a dialogue focused

It is fa

strives to fill in the

spaces between disparate realities and

dualities.

with others in

between conf1

on

:i:

making meaning, affirming selfhood, and constructing

consciousness thi^ough the symbols of
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anguage.

the

In "'Semiotic

and a Theory of Knowledge,'^ Wialker Percy states that, this

dialogue is essential to itteaning-makihg and is funda mental
to the construction of huina;n consciousness:

Without the presence of another, symbolization

uannot

conceivably occur because there

tfhom the

is no one from

word can be received as meaningfu1.

The irreduiiible

condition of every act of symbolization

is the

renderihg intelligibie; that is to say, the foil mulation
of experience for a real or an i.mp1ied someone

else.

■ ■■ ■(257)

Although historically, ;particuia|rly in the Victierian
tradition, self-knowledge and knowing-in-general hav<ii

been

thought to originate withiri monologue 5, Atwood suggel3ts

that

even in what appears to be an internal monologue, vo|Lces of
"others" are present.

In a true monologue, there woi,lid

be

only one voice, but because the funct ion of language! is to

communicate-—to co-conceive of experienee—and

since any
;

symbolic communicative endeavor requir es

,

1

a triadic

relationship—one who originates the symbol, the syml)Ol
itself, and the receiver who makes

the

symbol meaninc

(even if that receiver is one's own self)—then even thought

itself can be considered a dialogue,

In the telling

story, then, Offred's "listener," or

jimagined other,

render intelligible her ordeal in the

new world.

' \ 'V

way, her experience becomes meaningfu

acts to

In this

. • ■

r' j

because there I is an

implied other who can "co-conceive" and affirm her
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of her

experience.

Through dialogue, even s dialogue conshructed

in her head, Offred begins to connect with others ahd begins
to formulate and assign meaning to her experiences.
relies on this dialogue because it is a key element

She

in her

process of reconstructing her conscicusness; as Perc y

states, "When the dialogue stops, consciousness stops"
(Signposts 148).

Therefore, in order t6 continue her

process of reconstruction, Offred must continue conn)ecting
with others.

She must continue the dialogic process

of

meaning-making.

In her quest for intersubjectivity, her need to:

connect, Offred "listens" and hopes fbr the voice of
another.

In a crucial scene, she "hears" this voice- in the

form of a "message" left by the Handmaid Who preceded her
Like the password "mayday" which was used by Ofglen in a
previous effort to communicate, the message is also in a

foreign language—in the phrase Nolit(3 te bastardes
carborundorum—Which she finds shortly after her arr;)Lval to
the Commander's house, etched in a coirner of her closet.

This is the first and only written message that Offred

receives, and she believes that this message was meaiit for
her.

Because she cannot understand tlie literal mearij hg of

the message, it means many different things to Offree;:

she

regards it at first as a kind of pray«»r; later, as a
command; and most often as "ancient h--eroglyph to whiich the

key's been lost" (190). And even though she cannot iiiake
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literal sense of it, for the first titme since her

.

consignment, she feels that she is "cpoitimuning" with another.
She states, "It pleases me to ponder His message.

It
i

pleases me to think I'm communing witth

her, this unkiiown
i

woman" (69).

■ •■

It seems as if this shatring of experiepce

through language, even a language tha

gives her hope.

t she cannot decipher.

It is as if she is now part of a cojiiimunity,
■

.

.

■

■

i

■

distinct and separate from the Gileadean regime. Fo.i;|' a
moment, she is no longer an object, but a receiver of" a
symbol, a symbol which allows her hope.

Paradoxically, the message's "meaning" becomes even

more ambiguous when it is interpreted
Commander.

What is truly ironic in this scene is that the

phrase—scrawled in the margin of a tcixtbook by the
Commander when he was a "schoolboy"—j.s written in a

crude

and bastardized form of Latin, represesnting the ultiniiate

breach of linguistic propriety and convention.

message, however, has survived from th[<e

This

time before, a time

when the Commander also "played" with language and
transgressed the rules imposed upon it.

It came from the

time when he questioned authority and convention, rattier
than implementing stringent conventions through his

.■■I

authority.
After the Commander shows Offred

the "original"

message, written beside a defaced picture

of the Venuis de

Milo in the book, he tells her that it was only a
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"schoolboy's joke."

With the translation-—"Don't let

the

bastards grind you down"^^—Offred understands the literal
meaning of the message, but she also

understands that the

previous Handmaid must have learned the message in the

Commander's study.

Offred feels uneasy, jealous even, with

her realization, "I have not been the first then.

TtD enter

his silence, play children's word games with him" (242).
One critic has suggested that after Offred realizes iler
Commander's si:udy.

predecessor learned this phrase in th e

and is informed that the original iiies sage was "only a joke,"
it would appear that
[T]he piece of text loses its status as a messai: e

therefore its potential to comfoirt Offred.

Not

and

a

message of sisterhood at all, it is, at least pi obably/

a male text, in a language as debased as the phc:3to
the Venus de Milo.

Perhaps this is so.

of

(Bergmann 84<?)

But perhaps, in an ironic way, c!»ffred's

discovery of the original message forms an even strojs^ger
bond of sisterhood between the two woiiien, an affirmatLioh of
sorts, between "spirits" of the past:

one spirit who haunts

Offred's room, the other "spirit" (Offred's past self) which

continues to "haunt" Offred's body.

1 would like to suggest

that it still offers her hope, and retrains its status as a
message, because it is the one thing t;hat she contimJies

repeat.

to

Whether or not it is in a "me.le language," s he

relies on it in her process to become
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more than an object

and to reconstruGt her self. She may, in fact, contilnue to

see the message as a sign of willful persistence, a message

both of hope and of spite.

Like Moira's persistent guest

for freedom/ it offers hope.

Even like Serena Joy's

insistehCe on knitting rows and rows of little boys and
girls and evergreen trees, it is "evidence

of her

stubbornness, and not altogether despi
icable" (263).

It is a

message whose meaning becomes ambiguous once she discovers
the meaning and the source; however, it is an ambiguity that

offers enough hope for her to cpntinue

to endure.

it offers enough hope for her to believe

A|t times,

she may prelvaii.

In the Gileadean world of either/or,

Offred's ohly

alternative to hoping is to believe ttiat "If my life is
bearable, maybe what they're doing is all right afte:ir all"
(243).

But she knows that it isn't a 11

right; she C|!>ntinues

to repeat the message, continues to d:raw strength from it.

Even in her most despairing times, when she contempli^tes
withdrawing so far into herself, "so far down and back that
they could never get [her] but" (291), when she sees herself

as "a blank, between parentheses.

she repeats the phrase to herself.

Be ween other people,"

E v^en after seemli

convincing herself that the phrase is not magical, i'
doesn't offer hope, when she repeats It and her only

response is "Fat lot of good it did hdr . . . Why fie
(291), she immediately fea1izes that she cannot give up
hope.

She sternly tells herself, "That will never do"
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(291).

Constantly in this battle bet ween being and nothing,

between despair and hope, between tru St and fear. Offred
knows that she must maintain whatever connections she

She must be valued, validated, affirm ed.

can.

She latches on to

any language which will offer her this hope and continue to

commune with others who share her hope.

In this way, hoping

that someday she'll get out, Offred continues to end}are.
However, conflicting with her need
is her need to survive within herself

She wants to be, ■

conscious of the world around her; she
wants to regain her status as subject

to endure in Gilead

wants to thin:c; she

When asked b T the

Commander, "What would you like?," sh B replies, "I wcould

1ike to know" (243).

However, she a1 lo realizes how

much

more powerful the Commander is than s le is, as shown ij in her

line, "But watch out, Commander, I tell him in my head.

I've got my eye on you. One false mo^/e and I'm deadj (113).
Because of this enormous difference in power, Offred

oscillates between thirsting for knowledge and then trying
to convince herself that she really doesn't want to };;now

after all.

Her oscillation between giving voice to lier

desire for knowledge and the subsequent repression of that

desire is evident in her statement, "Maybe I don't
want to know what's going on.

Maybe

Maybe I couldn't bear to know" (252).

'd rather not k now.
But she does want to

know, and because she wants to know, she takes risks which
could cost her her life.
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The most notable, and also proba bly the most ironic way
that Offred takes risks, and "breaks

the rules" impojsed by

the regime, is by consenting to join the Commander in his
study—^an "oasis of the forbidden"~w ithin which evelrywhere.
blatantly is the written word, "Books

Dooks,

and books and

right out in plain view, no locks, no boxes" (177).

And in

this oasis of the forbidden is the opjportunity for O ffred

to

experience her first taste of freedom
Offred enters the forbidden and chooses (in a sc nse) to

break the rules, thinking that the Co;inmander

wants to do

something indecent, illicit, forbidden, all adjectives
suggestive of a Sexual encounter in tle world before

Yet,

even though he has not asked her into his study for a sexual

encounter, but rather to play a game of Scrabble witii him.

Offred realizes—after forcing herself not to laugh

dLt

the

banality of the request—that even thti game of Scrabl:>le-—
"playing with words"--has taken on nev^ dimensions:

Now

it's forbidden, for us.

s

indecent.

Now it's dangerous.

Now it

Now it's something he can't: do with his Wlfe.

Now it's desirable" (179). Before, Sci'abble was only

a game,

and not highly prized by Offred.

by old

It vras game played

men and women in retirement hom(as, anc. in her mother s day,

a game of adolescents. It was out-of-|date and old-fashioned
and not of interest to her.

However,

now that Offred has

such limited access to language, since language is
considered a commodity in Gilead, a highly guarded o:in(e
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at

that, the game takes on new dimensioiis for her.

only the game itself, but what it represents:

It is not

unlijsiited

possibilities to manipulate language, to •Chink,
choose,
think, to c

to become empowered.

Because she has| the opportunitiy
opportunitij to

create words, to manipulate language--in both a literal and
a figurative sense—she takes on a new

dimension of

humanness, and sees herself as subject rather than olbject
and the Commander takes on this new dimension of humanness

as well.

They are no longer objects,

Language alloi's

them

to think, and it fills in the space between emotion and

logic.

Language allows her to bridge the disparity ! between

mind and body; language allows her to
suggested in the following lines,

think and feel

"I hold the gloss;

corners with their smooth edges, finger the letters,
feeling is yoluptupus.

as

This is freedom, an eyeblink

The

of it .

. .What a luxury" (180).

For Offred, access to language, 1(10 matter how maindane,
is euphoric.

In this passage, Atwood

and provocative nature of language, (bffred feels the words,
she feels their power; they offer posssibilities and

alternatives.

Through language, Offreid realizes, comes

thought and a renewed sense of self,

With language.

longer has to suffer being defined by others.

Language

offers her the chance for self definittion and self
affirmation.
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she no

However, there are certain drawtacks to Offred

playing liaison with the commander,

s word-

Although she feels

somewhat empowered—"It*s difficult for me t^o beliefel have

a power over him, of any sort, but I

do" (272)--she klsb

realizes that her lack of fear, diminished through her
empowerment, can be dangerous.

She knows that any ppwer she

has is of "an equivocal kind" (272).

She knows who holds

the real power, and that she is reall y no more than phe

Commander's mistress.

(One step up from a Handmaid,[ to be;

certain, but a baby step at best.)

A

chasm remains ikstweeri

her and the Commander—in relation to power, choice, and

freedom—-and that chasm is never filled in.

The

hierarchical power structure is not overturned.

Shcn :[ can

never quite join with him because the power structur a, which
he helped create, will not allow it.

Language in Gilead is

patterned to separate rather than to join, and as their

attempts to connect through playing Scrabble illustrate,

even intellectual intercourse in Gileeid is disjointed and
unfulfilling.

As Offred states, "If j.t were sex it would be

a swift furtive stand-up in an alley somewhere" (194)
Through exploring this inability to join in

communication, Atwood illustrates yet another duality
work in both the novel and the "real"

world:

at

oppositlional

and asymmetrical ways in which conversational goals aire
generally perceived by males and females.

internal and external ways of speaking i
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In both hipir

Gffred typicajlly

illustrates what might be defined as "feminine'' wayj

speaking.

of

As linguist Deborah Tanneri points out, the

in feminine communication is intiinaci

which focuses

creating connections and forming comnunity.

goal

on

On the

other

hand, in masculine discourse, the goal is to achieve

or

maintain status by keeping the "Upper h^nd" in
conversations/ "winning'? discussions, and dominatihg

conversations.

In status~oriented conversations, an

individual perceives the world, and therefore engage

3 in it.

as "an individual in a hierarchical social order in which he
is either one-up or one-down" (Tannen

24),

Tanhen siiiggests

that conversations in this world are jiegotiations
in which people try to achieve and maintain the

upper

hand if they can, and protect themselves from o :hers'

attempts to put them down and push them around,

then, is a contest, a struggle to preserve
and avoid failure,

Life,
bendence

(25)

Due to his goals of achieving/maintaining status and

avoiding failure, the Commander "speaks'' a language lii hose
are governed by logic and reason and driven by
fears of being perceived inadequate arid/or weak.

He

his
must

keep the upper hand in his exchanges With Offred; he

continues to assert his authority over her. In speak ing
with her, he continues to command, rather than sugge
terms of the conversation.

t, the

He orders her to play Scr abble

with him (and she knows the consequene:es
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of makibg hi n

feel

silly by "shrieking with laughter" at the request, so she
complies); he sets the 1imits on the amount of time that

they will play; he decides when the

ga:me

is over and!tells

her when it!s time for her to "gb home " Therefore,!even
though he allows her access to languagie, the rules governing
the context of the ia^

are still in his control

He is

still in control of her mind, her body, and her actions.
other occasions as well, the Gommandeir decides what 1 e

On

and

Offred will converse about (in linguisjtic terminology, he

initiates conversational topics—a siqn

of conversati onal

dominance) and in which context they yill speak.
context is generally one of her submisision

and it is also drained of thought and

to his aut:hority,

emotion.

does bring up the topic of the "message"

The

When Offred

and asks what

happened to the woman who wrote it, tl.e Commander tellIs
that she hanged herself, and then adds, "That's why ftle

the light fixture removed.

In your rcdm" (243).

had

But

he

states all of this, not with emotion ri or with a sensd

of

sadness or of loss, but rather with "t

With his lack of emotion, Offred
again, how little valued she is in Gilead.

her

(243).
,■ on ce

Even with (or

possibly especially with) the Gommander, Offred real!zes

that she is still no more than an object, although sh a •s
gone from being an object of reproduction to an objec

with

whom the Commander can sinfully Scrabble and even "dress up"

like a plaything for an illegal and illicit "night on
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the

town" at Jezebel's.

She realizes that she is a replacement

for his former mistress, and that she, too, is replaceable,
as shown in her line, "If your dog dies, get another" (243).
Communioation, then, when its terms are

dictated in

a

masculine way-^when the speaker's goaIs are to avoid'
humiliation, preserve independence, and avoid failuriie--will
act to further disconnect and alienate others.

It r astricts

movement and further isolates the communicators intoi their

respective spheres of nothingness.

It does not unite and

join—it divides and conquers.

Offred's conversational goals, hbwever, focus oh

connecting with others and forming bonds of mutual risspect

and trust.

Her primary goals are to puild a sense of

community, renew a sense of hope, and reaffirm herse.|Lf
effort to make sense of the world.

in an

T'le desire to acl:lieve

these goals is based on her effort to

overcome her s®mse of

nothing, in order to continue reconstructing and continue in
her process of becoming more than an pbject.

In attaining

these goals, then, her primary focus 4^ not on the
hierarchical, adversarial contexts of speech, but rather on

language's power to unify and join, ^rom her interactions
with others. Offred desires intimacy eind approaches 1 he
world as "an individual in a network of connections" (Tannen

25).

In this world, Tannen suggests,

individuals str ive to

make connections in an effort to avoid isolation.

Th eir

chief goal is the formation of community, in an effoht
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"to

protect themselves from others* atteiri]pts to push them away"

(25). Tannen states that people who^e
focus on intimacy have a world view

conversational1 goals

W-herein

"life id

a

community, a struggle to preserve int imacy and avoid
isolation" (25).

In her effort to es tablish connections

with others, to negotiate rather thani "dictate" what; is
known about the world and about the £ elf, Offred cor:tinues
to strive to "commune" with the other, to form bonds of vN,;;;,:

intimacy and trust.
However, because she and the Coirimander

still cq nverse

in ways that their previous language, in times before
Gilead, dictated—rational, unemotional, and status

oriented^—-they fail to agree on what the world means

and

what they mean in relation to each other, or what th e goals
of their conversations truly are.
goals remain in opposition.

Their conversational

This conflict in conversational

goals only acts to further confuse Offred in het quieSt to

reconstruct herself.

Is she an object, useful primafrily

only for breeding purposes who moves up the hierarchiy and
becomes an object with which the Commander might "entertain"

himself, whether sexually, in game piaying rendezvous, or to

be watched during her "illicit reading
kind of performance" (239)?

that seems like a

Or is s he

more than that?

Does he really see her as a thinking, feeling being?

Offred

doesn't ever answer these questions directly; she nef/er
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Instead, she

states what she "is" to the Coramander

herself in relation to hiin by what she

defines

isn't:

To him I'm no longer mbrely a usable body.

To ;him I'm

not just a boat with no cargo, a chalice with ri^o
in it, an oven—to be crude—minus
not merely empty.

the bun.

wine

To him I'm

(211)

She has become more than nothing, but still defines lerself
in relation to nothingi

She remains immersed in the!

confusing, painful, and difficult process of "becoming," in

which ambiguity and uncertainty play |a major role.
Although much of the dialogue between the Commander and

Offred reflects this status/intimacy apposition; it is not
only Offred who strives for intimacy nor the Commandeir
strives for status.

Indeed, in some instances, thesfi

who

roles

are reversed and the Commander allows his "feminine" voice

to replace his masculine voice.

Instead of struggling for

dominance, he desires intimacy as shown most noticea.1)ly in
his request that Offred kiss him "as if [she] meant
(181).

t" ■ ■

However, when the Commander strives for intimacy, it

is as if he is using a foreign language, or at least
language with which he is not familial:.

Offred, fluent in

the language of intimacy, realizes this immediately.

She

hears not only the words he speaks, but also the rhythm, the

intonation, and the diction.

She eatb^es the "falsity'' of

the conversation, even the falsity of his wotd cholcfi?

(describing himself as "an ordinary^
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guy"), which

cause her to be on the defensive.

A].though she is a ching

for communication and feels "speech backing up insi^e

of

her/" she resists The Commander's attempts at intimaicy,

thinking, "If I talk to him I'll say something wrongi,
something away.

give

I can feel it cominc[, a betrayal of myself,

I don't want him to know too much" (2 39).

What she feels is

at risk is her self, the self she has been able to

reconstruct up to this point.

She ch ooses not to take the

risk, as much as she, too, desires ir|timacy and
conversation.

Therefore, although Offred realizes that the Co mmander

wants intimacy, she also realizes that she cannot give him
what he wants.

He is her adversary, one whom she ha

learned not to trust.

Even though he strives for iinjbimacy,

the falsity of his request and his unfamiiiarity wit:ti

language of intimacy cause her to pull away from himi

the
She

understands that intimacy is something not won through force
nor might nor conversational dominance, but rather tlat it
requires a pre-established bond of trust, something

that

Offred does not feel has yet been established between them
So, although the Commander has become

more real for

tier

through the sharing of Xanguage (as s tie states, "He is ho
longer a thing to me.

That was the problem . . . It

complicates" [207]), she still Cannot
intimacy.
all.

trust him with

At this point, she cannot risk trusting him at

Ironically, what she has achieved through dlst incing
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herself from him are the masculine gc als of status oriented
speech:

she does not give anything a way and preserv es

whatever dignity and independence she feels she has gained
at this point in Gilead.

In most of their conversationsj

Offred and the

Commander continue to oscillate between intimacy and status

as the goals of their exchanges.

Their goals are always in

opposition because the society which

dictates their

respective places in a hierarchical s/stem has "written the

rules" which predetermine them to be adversaries.
powerful; she is weak.

them.

He makes deci sions; she abides by

He defines himself; she is def Ined by him.

free; she is enslaved.

He is

He is

They exist in opposition; hence,

their discourse reflects and reinforces this oppositional,

adversarial relationship.

Whether either speaks a f4iminine

or a masculine language, they continue to speak in

opposition.

Therefore, they never are able to truly

communicate, and are confined to playing word games T^^ith one
another without ever forming a strong

connection or c

a bond of intimacy.

With the Commander, Offred is never able to strike a

balance.

She continues in her pursuit, to unify the

polarities between masculine/feminine ways of being and ways
of knowing, but she never overturns the system,

she

proceeds in the spaces in between dichotomies, and searches
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for a way of being which will allow l^er to endure wliile
hoping to prevail.

According to Sherrill Grace, this tendency to work

through, rather than overturn, dichotjomous relationsihips and
to resist the tendency to pattern the world as a system of
oppositions, is a distinctly Canadian world view.
than embracing either pole of a dicholtomous

Rather

extreme-

particularly those of social/individuial, subject/ obigect,

by lending credence to

male/female, or public/private—therel

and reinforcing these dichotomous pattterns, Grace states

that Canadians have historically stri^ven to cOnstrucit

a

vision which is "pluralistic and communitarian," one| which

is "resistant to subject/object dichotomies" (3).

I;-

is

this Canadian (although not exclusively Canadian) coitimitment
to community, to the formation of bonds and relation!

:
■ ■
,
'
I
between individuals, specifically through language, tbhat
weaves the fabric of many of Atwood's texts and is

particularly evident throughout Offred's narrative ih The

Handmaid's Tale. In this sense, language is the mediator,
■

,

ij

or agent of interaction, which is essential for working
through the tension caused by dichotomies.

In Grace's

words, language fills in the "space in between" pol0s in a
dichotomous relationship.

In discussing two previou

by Atwood (Bodilv Harm and Sjirfacing),

novels

Grace concludes that

Atwood refuses to be silenced by the "space betw een,"
and she consistently affirms the power of langua.ge to
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fill in the gap, to create a tft rd way of being

out of

the either/pr alternatives whichi her system resists and

at moments negates.

(3)

The Handmaid's Tale attests to Atwooe •s resistance dgainst
j

embracing either term in a dichotomy.

In her narrative,

Offred resists embracing either the static concepts of being
or of nothing; she knows that in Gile ad, both are illusions

both at the sj

and she can be defined by either or

time.

ame

In the final analysis, her narrative is a texituai

record of her reconstructive process

of "becoming," la

process which demands interaction with others, through
language, in an effort to reconstruct and affirm her
consciousness and make her world meaningful.

own

And as

Offred's narrative demonstrates, through writing the

space

between, she comes to know her self.

This chapter has examined the wa ys that Offred'
narrative writes and "fills in" the blank text, the :space

between dichotomies and disparate entities.

In Chap:er 3, I

will examine the ways that Atwbod writes the space between
yet another dichotomy, that of darkness and light.

Chapter

3 will also explore the relationship between—or "space
between"—reader and writer, fbcusing on how each might join
with the other—interacting through t!le

written word4—in an

effort to make the world of the text, and possibly even

their own worlds, more meaningful.
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CHAPTER 3

AMBIGUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE QUEST FOR FREE DOM

Writing, no matter what its subject, is an act of
faith; the primary faith being t:hat someone put there
will read the results.

I believ e it•s also an act of
better than they are.
If the writer is very lucky and lives long enough, I

hope, the hope that things can tje

think it can also be an act of charity.
Margaret Atwood, "An End to Audience?"

Through her narrative, Offred writes the space i between

many dichotomies, and in the process,

reconstructs h ar self.

However, at the end of her narrative she is once again

positioned between another pair of co ntrasting imhges:
images of darkness and light.

In this final scene,

again confronts ambiguity—her death

or her new life

the

she once
—an

ambiguity which she has learned can b a more freeing than the

illusion of certainty because of the ]3pssibilities ai;Id

choices it offers.

Therefore, in the

novel's closinc
g scene,

Offred chooses once again to immerse ! lerself into the space

between, and "step[s] up, into the darkness within; or else
the light" (378).

For readers who don't share Offred's appreciation for
ambiguity and uncertainty, for those vrho don't pereei ve

the

freedom inherent in ambiguity, this scene may be
frustrating.

It leaves unanswered questions.

But fcir

.

Offred, who has learned to see in the darkness as wel 1 as in

the light, the scene allows her the opportunity to once
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again go beyond either/or ways of knciwing and being.

The

ambiguity she confronts allows her td enter the realm of
uncertainty, the realm where choices and alternative

reside.

But in order to appreciate and even embrace

ambiguity, Atwood seems to suggest that one must be |able to
see in and appreciate both the darkness and the lights and

moreover, to appreciate any source of light, no matter how
little there is to see by.

Atwood ma:Ices this point not only

in The Handmaid's Tale. but also in ttie final lines of her

later novel. Cat's Eve.

In the final scene of that novel,

the central character and narrator, E Laine, looks out the

window of an airplane and states.

Now it's full night, clear, moonless and filled

with

stars . . . Echoes of light, shining out of the

midst

Of nothing.

it.

It's old light, and there's not much

But it's enough to see by.

The final lines of both Cat's Eye and

of

(445)
The Handmaid's Tale

reinforce Atwood's view that developing "night visiorj"—the
ability to see in the dark as well as in the light artd

to

see a source of light where there appears to be only
darkness—is of utmost importance in iti aking sense of

both

the characters' selves and the worlds of the novels

ithin

which they exist, as well as making sense

of our selves and

the world within which we exist.

Like many of Atwopd's other protagonists. Offred
to see as well in the darkness as in tae light and to
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learns

appreciate any source of light, particularly the source

■

,

In Gilead, Offred had to

which comes from within herself.

learn to see in both; as indicated by the structure

of the

novel, she spent most of her time in both 1itera1 and

figurative darkness.

Structurally, the novel is div|ided

into fifteen sections, eight of which are entitled

[Tight,"

a structure which highlights a repetitipus and Cpnti;Cluing
darkness punctuated by flickers of light.

Throughoi;.

the

novel, Offred makes her way through the literal and

figurative darkness of Gilead—a spiritual, psychological,
and intellectual darkness—and in the process develops a

strong sense of "night" vision.

It m.ay be that one of the

purposes of her narrative is to enable her imagined 3.istener

and future readers of the text to develop this same siiense
night vision; to enable them (us) to

of

•read" both her culture

and their own culture in the manner w:liiCh she has "read" and

written the "text" of Gilead.

In her quest to see clearly in both the darknes$ and

the light, Offred has relied on the power of language to
write the space between dichotomies and contrasts to

reconstruct her self.

In highlightinc the cohtrast of light

and dark at the conclusion of the narrative, Atwood

eems to

suggest that even the terms themselves are ambiguous.
■

Even

j

those things which seem most clear—the most we11^1iO —may
be the ones that are the most dark.

illustrated in Offred's narrative:
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This

point was

j

those
ose in power, those
ti

who thought they saw the world most (Clearly and att<i! mpted to

structure a society which would act as a "light" to|the

rest

of the world, clearly were swallowed up in the darkness of

their power.

Instead of constructing a source of light, the

powerful in Gilead created a psycholpgical, spiritual and
intellectual void of darkness.

But Offred learned to see in and make her way through
the darkness.

She tried to make sensse of it, tellirig of it

through her narrative, and reconstructing her experiences
through language.

However, she soon discovered that!

language has a paradoxical power all its own:

light/dark dichotomy, it has the pow^:r
to confine.

like the

both to liberate and

Offred was confined when language was "used

against her" through the acts of labe ling or when its

was restricted by the powerful in Gilead.

use

But she ajIso

found that even within the intellectual darkness of Silead,

language offered her the opportunity

for freedom and for

reconstruction.

Instead of focusing only on the dark and impris 3ning
qualities of language. Offred learns that freedom isj
possible, even within the confines of Gilead, even w Lthin

the confines of language.

She experiences

freedom through telling her story.

a

o

I n the telling,

reconstructs not only her self but also

showing, in effect, that within every

reconstructs

she

events,

text there are "gaps"

Which offer alternatives and possibilities.
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sense

Even wi ::hin the

rigid and repressive system of Gilead, there are
opportunities to recreate and re-invesnt.

for change, for reconstruction.

There is t:he power

Becc.use she identifies the

power that exists within the narrati\ e, through telling her
story. Offred realizes that she is not powerless after
she has the power to reconstruct her

all.

self and her story

through the telling of it, and though she could seizie

upon

this power and fabricate any part of the narrative for any
purpose, she continually struggles against fabricating her
story.

Instead, aware that what she offers is a

reconstruction, she identifies the am biguity involved in

telling any story and enables us to see how language can be
both clarifying and distorting.

In her narrative, she

strives to provide the reader with as complete and fully

contextualized account of her experie nces in Gilead

as

possible, to enable us to see the ambiguity arid to become
aware of the many possibilities that

reconstructions offer.

One of the first times Offred re onstructs events is
after the Commander asks her to kiss !lim.

She tells that

she thought about stabbing him with t:le sharp end of|a
toilet lever, how she would feel "the blood coming out of

him, hot as soup, sexual, over [her] 1lands" (181).
immediately, though, she admits that she really didn t

consider killing him at the time, that she only "put

afterwards" (181). Because she understands the poweji

it in
of

language to reconstruct both selves ai|id events, to c!:lange
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history so-to-speak, she understands that she can a<: d

or

delete details as necessary to achie'v^e a speciiic pi:rpose.
Offred sees that language is not staliic, but rather

that it

is malleable and fluid/ and with thisi realization shie

further realizes that she has the power tb change evients,
and even to change her life, through

her reconstruGt ion of

■It.

Although language has given Offr[ed a s®hse of pipwer
is a power that she seems to fear as well as desireJ|

it

She

seems to be aware that there is something frightenirig about
this power of language and reconstruction, similar to the
fear identified by Michel Foucault as he "considers from the

outside what might be strange, frightening, and perh'aps

maleficent about discourse" ("The Order of Discoursej" 1155).
This frightening component of discour£se
■ :
■ .'V'
, .

is its
■

■

■■

.

!

■

11
■ ■ I/ .
.1

■:

■

■■ ■

^
•: 

uncontrollability, an uncOntrollabililty which allows; for
alternatives but also has the potentieal
chaos.

to create utter

As Foucault states:

It seems to me that beneath this apparent veneration of

discourse, under ttiis apparent Icogophilia,
fear is hidden.

a ce|rtain

It is just as ijf prohibitions, ;

barriers, thresholds, and limits

had been set u|) in
■

\

order to master, at least partly,
, the great
■

■■

• -^ ^ ■.■■ , ■ ■ ■ -I

■

. /, I

■ '

•'

: / .■

j

I ' ■ ■' ' • ■■■ ■ :'■ ■! ■-

' ■ ■! ■:

■ ■ ■ • ■ • ■- ■ ■ - I ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

proliferation of discourse . . . I imagine in oiir

■■■

society there is a profound logophobia, a sort bf mute
terror against the surging up of all these statiaments.
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^ '

■■■ ■ .' .

against all that could be violent, discontinuous.
pugnacious, disorderly as well, and perilous about

theitt'—against this great incessant and disordei•ed
buzzing of discourse.

(1164)

Similar to FOucault, Offred discover^ that the rulesi
governing language are imposed from the outside and

removed to reveal language's fluidity.

can be

But with thi s

discovery, she at once identifies iti^ freeing qualit:ies,
while at the same time she confronts the chaos and

discontinuity that that freedom entails, the very a pects of

language that terrify the powerful iiji Gilead.

Offre d

develops a love for words, but it is a love which ca nnot

nurtured in an environment where logdphobia—-the fear
words—reigns.

Thereforef although sihe loVes words

of

and

language because of the freedom inheij-ent in them, her
of words is continually squelched by a regime which

be

love

fears

the proliferation of meaning, who feUrs the "violent
discontinuous, pugnacious, and disorcierly" qualities

language.

of

Because of their fear of language, the pdwerful

in Gilead desperately strive to control it by impostng
prohibitions, barriers and thresholds in an effort to

master

not only language, but also the people who use the language.
By enforcing these restrictions on lahguage, they

'

simultaneously strive to enforce restrictidns on the growth

of human consciousness, and to turn subjects into objects.
symbols into signs, and consciousness into
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non-consciousness.

language;

It is no wonder 1:hat Offred desi res

it offers her alternatiyesS to Gilead>

Although Offred loves the freeing qualities of

language, she also seems to fear the power which conjes

with choosing freedom through gaining access to

uage.

As Foucault warns, "Discourse is not simply that whiCh

translates struggles or systsms of dcimination, but it

thing for which and by which there is struggle, dis
the power which is to be seized" (1155).

is the

ourse is

This struggle is

evident throughout the novel; it is a struggle between the
powerful who strive to restrict discourse and the people who

I

strive to redefine theiriselves and neglotiate "reality"
through the exchange of discourse.

Gilead vividly

i1lustrates Foucault's assertion that discourse is the

struggle, a struggle which is centered on the will

or;

power.

However, Offred rebels against tle will for power.

has the opportunity to seize the power that language
her, but she resists.

She

offers

Her narrative affords her the

opportunity to tell and tecreath events iw any way that she
likes.

Although she has the power to

reconstruct history through the telling of her tale,

she

struggles against fabricating her stojry.

instead

Therefore,

of fabrication, she strives for authenticity, for a
reconstruction which centers on the confusion and ami:•iguity

which encircle events as they happen cind which is muJ tiplied
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in the retelling of those events.

She does not ignore the

ambiguity; rather, she identifies it and works throT|igh it,

presenting scenes in all their complexity to her lisi tener.
providing all the context that she possibly can
However, so difficult is the tassk of contextualizing

experience that Offred finds, at leasit twice, that 1t

is

impossible to capture all that surrounds an experienlce,
that the experience is embedded within.

She realize;s

all

that

what can truly be offered is only a r econstruction qf

events.

Nothing can be retold (nor remembered) exad bly hOw

it occurred because the context within which it occurred can
never be fully recaptured.

As Offred states, "A movie about

the past is not the same as the past" (306).

The best one

can hope for is a reconstruction which is not the Trlth in
any absolute sense, but which, in Offred's words, "iiicludes
the truth" (344).

When telling the s"::ory she is acutely

aware that it is a reconstruction because

j

It's impossible to say a thing exactly the way it was,
because what you say can never be exact, you all(ays
have to leave something out; thei-e are tbo many parts,

sides, crosscurrents, nuances; too many gesture's, which
could mean this or that, too manj shapes which qan
never be fully described, too mar y flavors, in the air

or on the tongue, haIf-colors, tc o many.

(174)

Like Offred herself, her story, as a reconstruction, resists
uniformity, correctness, and exactness
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Because the

celling

of a story is not the same as living the story, thei:e will

always be something left out, somethj.ng not qapturec
fully explained.

nor

However, Offred is so completely q onscious

of the fact that context is of the ut:most importance in
interpretation that she fills in all that she possibly can

in the telling of the tale.
Because Offred is well aware Of

the many ways

tiat

context influences—some might even say "determines""—the

interpretation and/or reconstruction of experiences

she

offers two different versions of her first rendezvoti!3 with

Nick.

The first is a highly sensual account, center ed

within the context of desire, passion, and a despera

for intimacy.

e need

And although it is a powerful and bellievable

reconstruction, Offred tells us that it really didn"i: happen

that way, and goes on to offer anothe^^ version, this

time

centered in a less romantic context.

in the second version, Offred ta:ces

into accouriil;

another level of the context Which suirrounds the experience.
It is the context of the "set up"; sh<i tells that Serena Joy
arranged the encounter because of her obsession to have a

child by any means.

Because of this overriding context, the

second version is told with much less passion, and it:

also

loses some of the sensuality and immediacy of the fir St.
Instead, in the second version. Offree, describes the
awkwardness and the disconnection whicb stem from the;

context which surrounds the experience—the acknowledgment
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that both she and Nick have agreed to Serena Joy's c ffer, an
acknowledgment which simultaneously suggests a lack

of

power, choice, and autonomy.

Offred

In this; context, both

and Nick remain under Serena Joy's pc>wer and controi
Although the first version suggessts that thfey h ave

regained some autonomy, choice, and sitatus as subjecits,

second version undercuts the power of the first.

Ini

both

the

the

second version. Offred illustrates hew both she and Nick are

really still immersed in the sphere cf objectivity,

Indeed,

the "corny and falsely gay sexual banter" whicjh they
: t

exchange in the second account reinfcrces

the false and

stilted context within which the experience

is embedled.

Offred herself states that the language acts as "an

acknowledgement, that we are acting, for what else dan

in such a setup?" (339).
context?

we do

What else can they do in t!lis

Their choices seem to be either to ignore -he

context of the "setup" completely-—as Offred does in

the

first account—or to acknowledge it a nd "play their ; Darts"
as sincerely as the context will allo w.

Through jux:aposing

these two distinctly different interpfetations of tho same
scene, Atwood illustrates just how crucia1 context is in the

interpretation (or reconstruction) of experience and|also in
the textual record of experience.

Although Offred does feel a sense of power throtigh the

ability to reconstruct events, she also realizes that being

conscious of the many ways that events can be interpi eted.
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even within the moment in which they occur, can be

(paradoxically) both confusing and cJ.arifying.

After

she

offers both versions of her meeting vrith Nick, Offred

admits, "I'm not quite sure how it hcippened;

All I can hope for is a reconstructiqn:
is always approximate" (340).

not exactly.

the way leye

feels

Here, she seems to iniply that

experiences, like love, cannot be recaptured precise

because they defy the space/time bounidaries
on them.

that we

impose

They can never be recaptured whole and int act

because they do not happen whole and intact.

Experi ances

are embedded within a context so complex that they
continually take new forms and shapes

with each

reconstruction, with each retelling.

They cannot be

reconstructed exactly because the subjject who recounts them
is embedded within the context which surrounds them.!

Through experiencing the moment, Offred becomes part of it.

She is not an objective observer who gathers and recc>rds
precise data for later distribution,

Rather, she loses

herself in the experience (or perhaps relinquishes herself
to the experience), and therefore, becoming a part of

the

context so integral to the recounting of experience, 'she
always conscious of the fact that she

exactly, what she has experienced.

is

can never relate,

All is a reconstr'uction

embedded in and interwoven with the cc ntext which is all.

Offred's efforts to fully contextualize

her

surroundings, the tale, and her self give the text itj
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life

force.

It is a force which has its source in the cllii:isire for

freedom.

Through her narrative, she strives not onll.y to

free her self, but also to free her text/ to allow:it the
possibility for multiple interpretations and

reconstructions.

In doing so, she relinquishes the

illusion

of authority implied by her authorial, stance, and st:

against "ownership" of the text or of future interpr etations
of the text.

Once again, she seems tio be

the will for power, and in doing so.

seems to echo the words

of feminist writer and philosopher Hcslene Cixous who states,
"I set my sights high:

I demand that love struggle within

the master against the will for power" ("A Woman Mistress"
1247).

Love, then, becomes a way of

against

the

will for power in an attempt to promote an environme nt—or
text or language-—within which power and authority are
decentered and equalized.

However, 1ove in this sense is

not the same as passion, nor is it the

same

as romantic

or

sexua1 love, although it may be expressed in these forms of
love.

Rather, Offred's love might be more clearly d(iifined

as the expression and actualization of generosity.

jove, in

the form of generosity, enables her to give of her st If^-in
the form of energy, time, and commitment'-•-•to the text.

It

is a love which drives her to contextualize her narrative as

fully as possible and to offer it the opportunity to find
its own expression as she creates it and at the same time

relinquishes the illusion of control over it.
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It is

almost

as though she decides, like the writer depicted in Sartre's
"Why Write" that

[A writer's] decision to write ^upposes that h«-i [or
she] withdraws somewhat from his; [or her] feelings, in
short, that he has transformed his emotions into free

emotions, as I do mine while reciding him; that is, that

he is in an attitude of generosity. (380)
As Sartre's passage isuggests, the writer who writes |with an
attitude of generosity expects the seme generosity from his

or her readers.

It is a reciprocal relationship, ba'sed on

trust, wherein the writer relinguishes
text
s control of the
th

in order that the text find its expression in the
interaction between reader and writer

In this sen e,

neither the writer nor the reader seizes the will fO|r power;

neither one seizes control of the meaning-making end savor.

Instead, both relinquish control and negotiate the mleaning
of the text.

As Sartre goes on to saY,

[R]eading is a pact of generosity between author and
reader.

er, each one co|ants on

Each one trusts the oth

the other, demands of the other

demands of himself [or herself].

as much as he [|>r she]
(379)

This "pact of generosity," then, is not

a form of

unconditional love, one wherein the w:riter makes no demands

on the reader.

Rather, it is a love ]oased on reciprocity.

one wherein the writer demands the same generosity—in the
form of energy and commitment—from her reader that
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he

demands from herself.

But, as Sartre notes, "Nothing can

force the author to believe that his reader will use his

freedom, [just as] nothing can force
the author has used his.
(380).

the reader to believe

Both of them make a free decision"

Both reader and writer, then, have the freeilom to

enter into a pact of generosity, but

the freedom in lerent in

this endeavor does not guarantee that either one wi .1
the demands of the other.

meet

A writer who writes in a

of generosity, who trusts that his or her readers w

11

reciprocate the love that is offered by demanding an much

from themselves as they demand frOm the text, is truly in a
precaridus position.

A text created in a spirit of

generpsity faces a vPry uncertain fui:ure, because not every
reader will answer the demands place<i upon him or h€ r by the
text.

Therefore, to write in a spirit of generosit

almost

demands that the writer take a Kierk«ig:aardian "leap

of ■

faith"—a leap of faith in the reader's ability and

or

;

desire to reciprocate the generosity that the author has

given, to put as much effort and commitment into reading the
text as the author put into writing :.t.
Because the writer can never de1:ermine if his or her

intent will be actualized in future ireadings of the text,
writing becomes an act of faith.

Thei writer must have faith

that his or her readers will enter into the pact of
generosity and join in the writer's quest to make the world

meaningful.

In this light, then, the; "demands" whihh Sartre
88 ■ '

suggests that the reader arid writer h ave

for one another

might be more clearly defined as "offers."

The writ|er:>

writing from a context of generosity, extends to the

reader

an offer to enter into the pact of generosity in hop ss

that

the reader will reciprocate with generosity—in terxs of the
expenditure of time, energy, and effoft—-when readin 3 the
text.

This reading, truly can never be demanded; it

rests

on a concept of freedom which allows for multiple

interpretations and multiple recqnstr|Lictions. It is

the

same freedom Offred strove for througrlout her impris anment
in Gilead, and it is the same freedom that she offers her
narrative.

Many readers, however, can not or will not enter into a
^

■ ' ,'

pact of generosity.

■ ■' .

■ "

■■ ■

i'l

These readers will continue to imprison

texts within their own ideological an<i contextual

constructs.

In the following chaptef' I will explore the

ways in which the epilogue of The Handmaid's Tale, a

seemingly disconnected section of the

novel entitled

"Historical Notes on THE HANDMAID'S TALE," illustrates

the

tendency of many readers to imprison texts within the ir own
ideological constructs.

Chapter 4 will also explore

the

dangers that stem from overlooking oui- own preconcepi^ ions
and assumptions when reading and intei'pretingf texts arid how
this tendency to overlook our own "contextual constructs"

might further stifle the proliferation of meaning,

i!s

Atwood vividly demonstrates in the epilogue, every re
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is a reconstruction of the original text.

Therefore

once

an author relinquishes control of the text and placeis it
into the hands of future readers, the text's future is

filled with uncertainty.

But this uncertainty is essential

for any text which represents the human quest for freedom;
it is based on the trust a writer has in his or her i eaders

that the meaning-making endeavor will continue regarq less

of

the contextual constraints—the assumptions and
preconceptions—that the reader brings to the text,

trust that is essential in any effort

It is a

to "connect" aiid

commune with others, and it is a trust; that helps us|
navigate through uncertainty and ambiguity in an effc?rt
negotiate a hew—and preferably impro\'^ed~"reality."
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CHAPTER 4

CONTEXTUAL CONSTRUCTS AND CONSTRAINTS

If we cease to judge this world, we ittay find ou:irselves,
very gUickly, in one which is in initely worse,
garet Atwood, "'VPitches"

Although At^oddqonsistently demionstrates

that

context

is all" throughout the novel-—both th:
irough offering

reconstructions and through providihg

as much contex t;as.:

V

possible within the text-^her strorigekt statement rec; arding
the importance of context is not foun
narrative.

within Offred

Instead, it is found in what

central text.

s

surrounds tlrle

It is found in the stat
tement Atwood makes by

centerihg Offred's harrative within ah historical context,

the context of the past which precedes it and the futbure
which awaits it.

Both the novel•s dedication and it

epilogue, which frame the central text

of Offred•s

experience, serve tb illustrate how context

affects nlot

only

the creation of a tbxtv bht furthefTOb^e, how it affec ts
future interpretations of that text.
The dedication serves to show th€! relationship between

"real life" and fiction.

By juxtaposing the "real 11fe"

experiences of Mary Webster and Perry

Miller with the

fictional experiences of Offred and Professor

Pieixot o

(in

the epilogue) Atwood questions the dis tinction often
associated with the words ''real life" and fiction.
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Instead

of showing these entities as contrasts, Atwood merges

life" experience and fictional experience

"real

to show th at the

boundary between them is not as clear nor as rigidly defined
as some would like to believe.

This Chapter exp1ore 3

the

ways that Atwood once again "writes the space betwee i" yet

another dichotomy, the dichotomy of "fact"

and ficti an.

One of the people to whom Atwood dedicates the :lovel is
Mary Webster.

Webster was one of Margaret Atwood's

ancestors who lived during Puritan ti:mes—a

Puritanii 3m

loudly echoed within Atwood'sGilead--who was tried

hanged as a witch.

md

Amazingly, though, Webster survi^^ed

hanging and lived to tell about it.

the

In her essay "W -tches,"

Atwood tells that Webster (who she st^tes is her "fa'rourite

ancestor") survived the hanging becau^e "they had not
invented the drop;
you up" (331).

in those days, th^y just sort of strung

On many levels, Webster's expefience is

hauntingly similar to Offred's:

both women lived in

oppressive, radically fundamentalisti<^

times and botli faced

a death sentence for their "crimes agginst the state
However, on another level the similarities
apparent.

are not a

Although the historical re<i:ord indicates r.hat

Mary Webster escaped imminent death

b€5cause,

as Atwoc

states, "she had a strong neck" ("Witcb:hes" 331), Atwc od

does

not offer us the same certainty conceirning Offred's e scape

from Gilead nor her subsequent survivicll

Although it

possible that Offred was rescued by Nick and the Mayc ay
•
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..

Underground, it is also possible that she was lead t D

her

death by Nick, the man she trusted, whose final word 3

to her

, '. ' .A ■

were, ironica1ly, "Trust me" (377).

^

If we trust Nic c, if we

believe that he was only pretending to hand Offred p /er

to

the authorities, then it is possible to believe that: Of fr^pd
escaped the walls of Gilead and survi ved.

However, If we do

not trust Nick, if we believe that he was actually o:le
the "Eyes" who pretended to love Offrsd, but instead
her trust and turned her over to the

of

abused

authorities, th( jn it is

possible to believe that Offred never escaped nor su:rvived

Gilead.

On this point, Atwood remain;3 ambiguous.

Biit

even

if Offred did not physically survive Gilead, an impo;rtant

part of her did surviye.

What survivi■3d

Gilead in ei :her

case is the text of Offred's life and her

the darkness of Gilead.

journey th

Like Mary Webster

story of her life for future generati^ns,

who left 1;he

Offred lea ^es for

us the text of her life, a text which

becomes the foi al

point for future "historians" who may

then use it as "data"

in their quest to reconstruct the pas:

and assemble I:he

textual record of history.
One of these real life historians is Perry Miller,

another to whom the novel is dedicated , who was an historian
and Professor of American Literature dt Harvard University
when Atwood studied there.

Miller wa , as critic Harriet

Bergmann notes, "a scholar of Mary Webster•s repressive and

religion-dominated society, just as Jd:mes Darcy Pieixoto,
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the academic who reads a paper on Offred's tale in ttie

epilogue, is of Offred's" (college Enalish 851).

In

dedicating the novel both to the woman who lived to tell her
story (Webster) and the man who retold—and

reconstructed-

ller), Atwood pjrovides

her stoty two hundred years later (Mi

an example froiji the real world which questions the "

of history that is passed down to futUre generations

This

question, then, becomes one of the im portance of context in
any interpretive endeavor, and a warning to all who
"decontextualize," decpnstruct, or minimize both peo pie and
texts>

In the epilogue, we leave the unfamiliarity of lilead
and are transported two hundred years into the future, to

the year 2195, which, ironically, is;

seemingly more |fami1iar

than the more recent "future" of Gile ad.

In the epilogue,

we are presented with "a partial tran script of the
proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium on Gileadean Studies."
The keynote speaker at the symposium is Professor James

barcy Pieixoto, an historian who delivers

a paper en itled

"Problems of Authentication in Referenee to The Hand]naid's

Tale."

Through Pieixoto, Atwood bril Liantly satirizes those

who, like perry Miller at Harvard and

the Commander in

Gilead, are in a particularly powerful position:

those who

have the power to interpret texts and whose interpre rations
are often sanctioned by the power str actures which tlese i-'''' 
people help create.

Atwood seems to suggest that, in very
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dangerous ways, the interpretations a nd reconstructions

offered by those in power—whether in the academy or

in the

political realm—often act to rigidify texts and limit
possible interpretations of those texts.

other

In Gilead,

those

in power imposed a single interpretation on Biblical

texts

which Constrained not only the texts, but also the p eople
within the walls of Gilead.

Likewise, in the epilog ue,

Professor Pieixoto hands down a single interpretatio n

of

Offred•s text which constrains her and limits future

interpretations of her text.

Atwood s understated y et

scrupulous use of irony in the epilog!ue

.

acts to rein force

her assertion that "context is all" in any interpretive

endeavor, whether it be an historical document, a fictional
text, or the world as "text."

Atwood sets the epilogue at the fictional University of

Denay, Nunavit, which is phonetically

None of it."

translated to "'

Besides serving as a satirical commentary oh

the nature of academic conferences, the environment
in Denay also serves to illustrate the firm hold that

hierarchical power structures and paradigms have on the
collective consciousness of both moderri and "native"

cultures.

As commentator Arnold Davidson has suggested,

Denay may represent the future nation that a number of

native people in Canada—particularly

those of Inuit

ancestry—wish to form in the north,

Davidson suggests that

this nation would be one in which "the
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traditional ways Of

the natives [would] replace the Western ways of thei
oppressors" (119).

However, as the epilogue shows, although

the native people—if names are any indicatiqn—have indeed
formed their own nation, they have not overturned thi2 system

which oppresses them.

Rather, hierarchical power Structures

seem to have remained intact, and as Davidson suggesjits, so

do the institutions that embody them (119).
On a surface level, the environmlent Atwopd crea :es

in

the epilogue seems to be much more civilized and egalLitarian

than the Gileadean environment.

In this future nation,

women have once again achieved "equality," as iliustiirated by
the fact that a woman. Professor Maryann CresGent Moon,
chairs the convention.

However, at a deeper level, Atwood

seems to suggest that the "equality" attained in this:5

future

society may be suspect, and furthermore, that we miglit do
well to look more closely at what we term "equality" in our

own culture.

For instance, despite Professor Cresceiit

Moon's rise in status in the academic

community, her duties

as chair seem to parallel those of a social chairperson:
she organizes nature walks, fishing expeditions, and
sing-songs, and she seems to be more concerned with

extracurricular activities than with cicademic concerriis, as

seen in her reminder to Professor Pied.xoto to "keep within

his time period . . . [because] none cjif us wants to miss
lunch, as happened yesterday" (380).
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Although women have regained soine status and po wer

in

this society, it may be—as Offred realized her own

sense of

power was in Gilead-^"of an equivocal kind" (272).

For

example, after informing the audience

of all the cha ages

the social calendar. Crescent Moon turns

in

the floor o v^er to

Professor Pieixoto who immediately sets out to releg ate
women—in particular Professor Crescent

the margins of the discourse.

Moon and Off red—to

He begins his "little

chat"

with a derogatory and demeaning reference to Profess ar
Crescent Moon, referring to her as the "charming Arc tic
Chair" which he is sure the audience is"enjoying" as much

as they enjoyed the previous night's "charming Arcti 3 Char."
Of course, the word arctic in this se ase could refer to what

is most likely Crescent Moon's inuit ethnicity—-in wiich
case the pun seems to be a racial slur—but the word also
elicits sexist connotations of "cold" and "frigid."

And

lest the audience miss the sexist con:iiotationiS of hi 5

remark, Pieixoto is quick to point ou:that he is using "the
word 'enjoy' in two distinct senses, iprecluding the obsolete

third" (381), an attempt at humor whi^h has, at its center,
the humiliation and degradation of wo:men.
Professor Pieixoto continues to irrivialize women and

their experiences by making them the

butts" of his jokes, a

strategy whereby he gains the illusioili of power over them,
Further attempts at huinor at the expense

of women occur in

his reference to the Underground Femai eroad

as the

"Underground Frailroad" (381) and hiss insistence on pointing
out the "pun" in the title of Offred s narrative,
"particularly that having to do with the archaic vulgar
signification of the word tail, that being, to some extent,

the bone, as it were, of contention in that phase o
Gileadean society of which our saga treats" (381).

By

belittling women and their experiencsis, Professor Pi.eixoto
strives to center himself within the discussion, th«S reby

maintaining power and control over tllie "Subject" uncil
discussion.

er

Of course, since this sgciety is set up as a

contrast to Gilead, and also speaks i much more familiar
language (familiar, especially, to any academic who has sat

through a similar "fascinating and worthwhile talk"), these
lines are rather clever, but the laughter (or chuckles or
even groans) they elicit may be an indication that this
society has not advanced all that much, nor learned very
much, from Offred•s account of Gilead.

AtWoOd may be

suggesting that in contrast to Gilead, Denay appears to be

more "well-lit," but in relation to the light that OJffred

reads by, it is still immersed in dajjrkness.

Likewise, in

contrast to Gilead, the environment in Denay is much more
familiar to us, but it is a familiarity that may blind us to
the continued use of language to devalue women and their
experiences

Particularly relevant in terms <j)f the devaluatl ve
of language is Pieixoto's consistent
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power

Use of the word s "item"

and 'Vdocument" in reference to Offred's story.

Both' of

these terms act to"objectify" and tfivialize the narrative

—and the harratbr-'-in very dangerous ways.

During his

discussion, Pieixoto reveals that he and his colleague^

Professor Wade, discovered and transcjribed "some thi;rty

tape

Cassettes" which contained Offred's criginal, spoken
narrative.

Besides transcribing her words, they al

o found

that they had to "arrange the blocks of speech in the
which they appeared to go" (383).

And while he doe

order

admit

that this "arrangement" is based on cfuesswork and is

to be

regarded as "approximate," he does not treat the final

text—the final construct—as an approximation.

Rat tier, he

continues to appropriate the text and. refuses to negotiate
its meaning.

Instead of entering int;o a pact of generosity

with Offred, Pieixoto rewrites and rednterprets Offred's
words and diminishes her presence in
Although Offred was well aware,

the text.

even at the moment she

was telling her story, that whatever form her narrative took

after its conception, "it [would] be

a reconstructicin

at yet another remove" (173), she still may not have

too,

been

prepared for the countless removes thtat occur before? it

reaches its final form, those removes Caused by the
of time and the misreadings of "historians."

passage

Nevertheless,

Offred's efforts to contextualize hei- life in Gileac and her

process of rebelling against uniformj.ty and correctriess
reconstructing her self remain within the text.
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Offred

in

provides all the context that she posisibly can in ari

effort

to help her "listener" see in and through the darkneiss

of

Gilead.

However, instead of paying atteijition to the coritext
which Offred strove so painstakingly to provide, Pieixoto

ignores the context of her narrative-^-all the flavoi s.
colors, gestures, crosscurrents—-and in the process

decontextualizes Offred in much the same way that the
powerful in Gilead decontextualized her upon her imijiersion

into Gilead.

Through his reconstruc"^ion, he erases

her from

the text in much the same way as she tells that she

was

erased from her daughter's life by tlie Gileadeans.

Echoing

through the text are Offred's feelings about being f.rased
from the text of her daughter's life , and by extensjon, the
text of her own life:

Time has not stood still.

It his washed over Ae,

washed me away, as if I'm a wom^n made of sand

.1

have been obliterated for her.

.I am only a shadow

now. . .A shadow of a shadow.

I am not there.

As Atwood demonstrated throughout the novel, throug 1

(296)

force

and might, the Gileadean government tfas able to

decontextualize Offred and remove her from the histpry of
her daughter's life.

But in the epilogue, Atwood si:lows

that

it would be left for future historia fis to decontextiialize

Offred once again by removing her fr om her bwri text
only record of the self she had becokie.
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Ironically

the

hoWeyer, Offred predicted that she would be erased i

rom

history even while she was in the process of composi ng her
self through her narrative.

She sta :es, "Frpin the |)dint of

view of future history . . . we'll be invisible'' (215). It
is a point that Pieixoto does not dispute—or perhaps does

not see—but in the text, Offred tells exactly how 4he feels
about being deconstructed not once, l5ut twice:

"I can't

bear it, to have been erased like that" (296).

Pieixoto,

obviously unaware of the contextual constraints thai,
influence his interpretation, overlooks these remarks and
most of the context that Offred provides in her narrative.

Besides overlooking the context that Offred provides,
Professor Pieixoto also overlooks what appears to have been

one of Offred's main concerns: the Importance of hiir

name.

Throughout the novel, Offred states that she has "h.jiLdden
name, like a buried treasure" (108),

her

a treasure whic:h she

does not give away freely, but offer 3 only to those

she can

trust.

her name

In the novel, the only person she entrusted

to was Nick.

However, she also entrusts it to us, if we are

able to see it.

five names:

At the beginning of her story, Offired lists

Alma, Janine, Delores, Moira, and June

In the

course of the narrative, each of these names is accbunted
for, except for the last name, June

It is quite possible

that this is Offred's name, although possibly not her "real"
name.

During his presentation. Professor

us that the other names were used as
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Pieixoto Informs

protective pseudonyms,

and quite probably, the name June is no exception.

But

because Offred knows that a name conveys a sense of
identity, it is likely that she would choose the nar e

"June"

because of the many connotations which derive from t he

single word, connotations which migh^ convey her owr1
of self.

sense

Offred may have chosen the name June because it
■

;

suggests a source of light:

■

11

June is the time of year when

there is more light than darkness, w:lich may sugges":

that

through her narrative she offers us k source of light by
which to read the Gileadean culture and also our own

culture.

In fact, Offred herself as lociates her name with

images of light.

She says,

[My] name has an aura around it, like an amule)
charm that's survived from an u nimaginably

...

some

distant past

my name floats there behind my eyes, no - quite

within reach, shining in the dark.
Offred's name has survived from the

(108)

past—both her ^wn past

and the "future past" which separates her from Pieixoto—and

it remains within the text/ shining in the dark, for those
who can see it.

The name June, then, acts to reinforce

of Atwood's Strongest points, specifically, striking

one

a

balance between dichotomies, particularly between dl

arkness

and light.

By offering us her name, Offred simultkne^ously
■ ■.

,

i

offers us a source of light with which to balance the
darkness of Gilead, and also the dai'kness which sui rounds
in our own world.

To miss the context of balance 1:;etween
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us

darkness and light is to miss what aTO
strongest point:

to be AtTi^ood's

in making sense of the written tOJkct

and

the "world as text," we must be able to "see" in the

darkness as well as the light.

,

1

Like Offred, we must develop

night vision.

professor Pieixoto, however, rejtaains night bliiid and
misses most of the context that Offred provides in

narrative.

ler

Instead of finding clarification, then.

the

narrative continues to puzzle him, and he laments t lat
[T]he past is a great darkness. and filled wit 1

echoes,

Voices may reach us from it; but what they say

to us is

imbued with the obscurity of the matrix out of

which

they come; and try as we may, w e cannot alway

decipher

them precisely in the clearer

ight of our own

(395)

Pieixoto, convinced that the "light" of his own day is much

better to "read" history by, fails t:o recognize thcit
only understand and make sense of Gd.lead, of oppre

sion and

horror, if we iinmerse ourselves witl^in the heart of
from which these atrocities emerge,

we can

darkness

Only if we caii identify

the darkness itself, and then learn to see in and t: hrough

the darkness—becoming as acutely aware of the shad ows

as

well as the well-lit images—can we learn from the past and

see into the present darkness which continues to surround
us.
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Unfortunately, Pieixoto is unab;Le--or possibly
unwilling—to see all the context that Offred provides
within the text, mainly because his <3oncerns are not the

same as Offred's concerns.
■ ■

. "

•

■ ■ ■. ■

•

■ ■ '

Offred is concerned with showing
,
/

■
■ ■ ■.

■ ■

• ■ ' ■■

' ■'
■

■

il '
i'! ■ •

the human element of the text; Pieixpto is concerned mainly
with authehticating her story and specifically with
establishing the Commander's true idsentity.

of the paper he reads at the symposittim
points.

In fac't, most

focuses on tl|iese two

at he has narroj//ed the

In his paper, he reveals the

historical evidence to two "brilliantt, ingenious gentlemen"

—Watserford and Judd—one of whom is most probably i the

"real" Commander.

His main regret iss that Offred did not

have the "instincts of a reporter or a Spy" because]
had. She could have then gathered ai;1

so desperately wants.

the "evidence!"

As he states, "What would W6|

give, now, for even twenty pages or so of print-out
waterford's private computer!" (393)

if

she

that he

not
from

Pieixoto is jhot

concerned with the human element-*ti:i<e subject--of tJhe text;

rather he is concerned with gathering hard evidence'
—objects-'-from the regime; and in t;his quest he cointinues

to margirialize Offred and her experiences through
appropriating her text.

While Pleixoto diligently searcthes historical |records

and doctimentS for clues about the Commander's identpity, he
overlooks—and in effect, silences—the voice whiclf

calls

out from the text.

silence

But, as Offred cnows, he cannc
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her completely; she knows that "[w]hatever is silencbed will

clamour to be heard, though silently" (196). We aret left

then, with the voice of a woman who l|ias struggled within and
finally survived Gilead.

Her story is a story of

survivalism.

Survivalism may not be as "weig:ity" as Pieixotp's
concern to collect "hard data" which would once-and -for-all

establish the authenticity of the tapes, but it is

xtremely

important in understanding Offred's message and by

implication, Atwood's message.

In her

essay

"Canadian-American Relations," Atwood defines the p;
of survivalism:

Survivalism, of course, is not

the same as tiragedy

or

existential despair or even pessimism about th e

human

condition.

one

It's being stuck ir a blizzard wit h

match; a kind of minimalism, fine, but if you get that
fire lit it's a triumphant event, considering

the odds.

(387)

Offred's text has survived the atrocpities of Gileae

The

existence of the tapes—and Pieixoto's subsequent
transcription and reconstruction of them into text -affirms
her survival and her existence.

It is an existence that is

trivialized by Pieixoto, but One th^t continues thi•oughout
time for readers who are able to see it.

Although

Pieixoto

strives to force Offred back to "the blank white spaces at

the edges of print . . . in the gap
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between the si:ories'

(74), her narrative resists the bounGaries that his [

interpretation forces upon it. Offr4d has written and
filled in the spaces between and her voice demands to be
heard.

Only those who refuse to read wtiat she has writ:ten

within the context she provides, pnlv those who insi st

on

erasing her from history, will contiiiue to lament w; th
PieixotO that "many gaps remain" (393) within the te xt.

Indeed, many gaps will remain in any text, particuls rly
those texts which resist the boundaries—hence

interpretations—•that future readeris

influenced by their

own social, political, and psych61og;Lcal cohtexts, impose on

them. But a voice will survive within the text/ ev4n though
it remains uncertain how that voice will be "heard.

Offred knows that by relinquishIng the illusioh of
power and authority over her text she offers the narrative

the same possibilities for freedom that
within Gilead.

she herself wanted

She also knows that she cannot dete:rmine how

the text will be read by future read ers.

No matter how much

context she provides, the text will be framed by the history
that preceded it and the future that awaits it.

It will be

read not only within the context she provides, but also

within the contextual and ideologica1
future readers.

constructs of her

Centered between the past and the future.

the text's future is as uncertain as Offred's future was at
the end of the novel.

At the end of her narrative
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Offred

finds herself "between two [stranger 5],
(378), who lead her toward an uncert

one on eithjsr side"

ain future. Li)jcewise,

after she relinquishes control of he r text, it also finds
itself centered between two "strangers," the strangers of
the past and the future.

And like Offred, who has •given

herself over into the hands of strangers, because i t

can't

be helped" (378), so too her narrative must be given over

into the hands of strangers—^like Pieixoto

and Wade, but

also like us—-whose readings will finally determine

the

meaning of the text.

But if we learn to read as Offrfed has, by bala ncing the
darkness and the light, by choosing

to enter into a pact of

generosity with her, the text will ejnswer many of o ur
questions.

With each reconstruction and reinterprej:tation,

Offred's voice, which silently clamors within the text,
continues to provide the context essiential for

interpretation.

Even so, she seems

to be aware tha t

in any

interpretive endeavor, there will always be questiq ns,

and

in a sense, she predicts Professor Pieixoto's fina
possibly rhetorical--question, "Are there any ques

ions?"

By closing the novel with this finaiL, enigmatic line, Atwood

seems to suggest that there will al\mys be questioris with no
simple answers, or whose answers reipain in the dar}:ness
which Continues to threaten the ligtit.
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CONCLUSION

If language is as old as conscicjusness itself, j|and if
language is a practical consciousness-for-othefs arid,

consequently, consciousness-forj myself,

then rufjt only

one particular thought but all cohsciousness is
connected with the development of the word . . ; The

word is a direct expression of the historical nature of
human consciousness.

Lev VygotskV,

Thought and Lanauaae

As presented in the Introduction, Whorf's hypothesis of
linguistic determinism suggests that there are many ways
that language appears to determine a n

view.

individual's jif/orId

Of utmost importance is the way that language, as a

vast pattern system, aids in the ereation of cognitive

schemes which enable us to gain know ledge about ourselves
and the world and in the process, aid in the constr uction of

our consciousnesses.

Because language is so closel y linked

to thought processes, if it is regar ded as static,

if

symbolic meaning is stifled, then th[e

cognitive

schemes will be adversely affected,

formation of

Placing restrictionS on

language and/or limiting the creatid:n of meaning resuits

a simultaneous restriction in the gijowth of knowledge

in

and of

consciousness.

Margaret Atwood vividly illusti'ated this restj

ictive

meaning^making environment throughout Offred's narii'ative and

possibly even more importantly, in the epilogue wh:lch
follows the narrative.

However, although Atwood highlights

^

! , •.

■ ■ ■■' [

and explores the fundamental canacitv of language io
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govern

our world view, I do not believe that she completely adopts
a Whorfian philbsdphy of linguistic determinismV

through Offred's narrative, she shows that there are ways to
rebel against and even brahscend lin<juistic deterininisro.

Tb

accomplish this goal, however, people must first id<;»ntify
the ways that language can be "used against" them:

through

the linguistic acts of labeling, thr 3ugh restricting
language to certain segments of soci sty, and through
■

,V ■ '' ;^

■

i

.■

■ ■ ■ ■ '■

sanctioning single interpretations o f any "text," whether
spoken, written or experienced.
Once aware of the many ways tha t language may constrain
our thought processes, we can find w ays to rebel against

becoming victims of language.

Instead of believinglj that

language only reflects "reality," we

can empower oi rselves

by perceiving language as a powerful

means to create new

realities.

We do not have to regard as final the

provisional analysis of the external or internal world that

is formulated through our language.

Through lingui stic

awareness, we might, instead, avail

ourselves of

possibilities offered by language.

If

the many

we can ident ify

in

language the potential for determinism, we can rebb1 against
those aspects of language which may constrain our ability to
freely process information and construct alternative
realities.

In The Handmaid's Tale. Atwood presented
us with
a.
•
ji
■
.

■

■

■■ f-

■ '■ '■

world so alien that it was readily apparent how language was
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used to subjugate and oppress the citizens of Gileaci

But

as Whorf suggests, looking at different cuitures--e'jren
fictional cultures—may be one way tp gain a clearer
perspective of our own culture.

Ratler than seeing only the

foreign and alien aspects of diverse

culturesj we in|Lght gain

more insight into our own culture by

seeing the simiLlarities

between cultures. It has been argued that the atrocities
that occur in Gilead could never occur in the "real world."

However, as Atwood has stated in an interview with i^athy

Davidson, everything that happens in the novel is "true" and
has, in some form, happened in the "real world" (inj

Davidson 115).

Arnold

Although the atrocities which occur through

language abuse may be more apparent in the Gileadea n

world

than they are in our own, we need orly look at the way that
Professor Pieixoto, in the epilogue. uses language

to assert

his power while he simultaneously diminishes the pciwer
others to see how language abuse is

a reality in

of

our

world" as well.

If the environment in the epilbgue can serve as

a model

of our own society, then identifying the ways that.

Pieixoto's discourse mirrors our own may offer projround
insight into the ways that we are oiJpressed—or the ways
that we oppress others-^through the use of language.

Therefore, by identifying the ways in which langucige might
limit our world view, especially on a subconscious level, we
can become more sensitive to the po litical contexts of

110

language which act to subjugate and oppress people iin our

own culture. By learning to "read" c>ur culture as c|ffred
read hers—through developing a keen awareness of aj^id

.

.

. ■

,

i

sensitivity to language—we might, like her, tap into the

many possibilities offered by languacje and reconstruct not

only our internal worlds, but reconstruct our external world
as well.

Ill

WORKS CITED

Allport, Gordon.

"Linguistic Factors in Prejudice.*

Ch. 11

of The Nature of Prejudice, by (3ordon Allport. f Rpt. in
Language Awareness.

Eds.

and Virginia Clark.

New York;

Paul

Eschholz, Alfred Rosa,
St. Martin's Press.

1974.

Atwood, Margaret.

"Amnesty Internetional:

An Addrijss."

Second Words 393-97.

—

"An End to Audience?"

Second i«?ords

"Canadian-American Relations."

Cat's Eve.
.

New York:

Second Words.

Second Words :

371-92.

Bantum Books, 1989.

Boston:

The Handmaid's Tale.

334-57.

Beacon Press, 1984.

j

Ballantine Bpoks,

New York

1985.

—.

"Witches."

Second Words 329-33.

Bergmann, Harriet
'"Teaching Them to Read':
Fishing
Expedition in The Handmaid's Tale." College English 51
(8) 1989:

847-54.

Bizzell, Patricia & Bruce Herzberg, eds. The Rhetorical
Tradition. Boston: Bedford Bc|oks, 1990.
Bram, Joseph.

Language and Society.

i
New York:

Random

House, 1955.

Casson, Ronald W. Language. Culture. and Cognitiohi.
York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1981.

New

Cixous, Helene and Catherine Clement[. "A Woman Mistress."
in Bizzell & Herzberg 1245-51.
Crick, Malcolm. Explorations in Language and Meaning.
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976.
Davidson, Arnold E.

"Future Tense."

Vision and Forms.

Eds.

New

Margaret Atwdod:

Kathryn Van SpanckerPn & Jan

Garden Castro. Carbondale: Southern Illinoi^ Press,
1988:

113-21.

Foucault, Michel. "The Order of Discourse."
Herzberg 1154-64.

112"::::

in Bizzell

&

Friedrich, Paul. The Language Paral
University of Texas Press, 1986

ax.

Austin:

Giles, Howard and Robert N. St. Claif, eds. The Soijial and
Psvcholoaical Contexts of Lanauhae.

Hi11 sdai p!;!!

Lawrence Erlbaum Assbciates, 19^0.

Grace, Sherrill E. "Articulating thi 'Space Between
Atwood's Untold Stories and Fresh Beginnings,"!'Atwood:
Language. Text and Svstem. Edsj Sherrill Grad# &
Lorraine Weir. Vancouver: Uniii/^ersity
Columbia Press, 1983: 1-16.

Kegan, Robert.

of British

The Evolving Self. (i:ambridae:

Haryard

University Press, 1982,
Ketterer, David.

"Margaret Atwood•s

Contextual Dystopia."
July, 1989: 209-17.

The Handmaid's Tale:

Science- 'iction studiesji 16 (2),

Danger, Susanne. "Signs and Symbols." The Essav Connection.
Ed. Lynn Z. Bloom. Lexington: D. C. Heath diid
Company, 1991:

Percy, Walker.

Book.

528-35.

Lost in the Cosmos:

New York:

The Last Self-Help

Washington Sqbare Press, 19}IS

"Metaphor as Mistake."

The Message in the Bottle

64-82.

"Naming and Being."

Signposts in a Strange Land

130-52.

"Notes for a Novel about the E nd of the World

The

Message in the Bottle 101-18.

Signposts in a Strange Land.

New York:

Ed.

Patrick Samway.

Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

The Message in the Bottle. N^w York: Farrai:

Straus

and Giroux, 1989.
St. Clair, Robert N.

"The Politics of Language."

Word (29)

1, 1978: 44-62.

Sartre, Jean—Paul.

Criticism.

"Why Write?"

Ed. David Lodge.

20th Cehturv Litclrarv

London:

Longmah, 1972:

371-85.

Slobin, Dan I. Psvcholinguistics.
Foresman and Company, 1974.

113

Glenview:

Scoitit,

Tannen, Deborah.

You Just Don't Understand;

in Conversation.

New York:

Women and Men

BalLantine Books, 1990

van Geert, Paul. The Development of 'erception. Cognition.
and Language. London: Routledg 5 & Kegan Paul,: ! 1983.

Vygotsky, Lev. Thought and Language. Trans. & ed. Alex
--rKozulin. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. ■

Whorf, Benjamin Lee.
Massachusetts:

Language. Thought, and Reality!.
The Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, 1956.

Woolfolk, Anita. Educational Psvcholggy. 3rd
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1987.

114

ed.

